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Abstract 
This paper explores the development of the relatively young and emerging asset class of Master Limited Partnerships 
(“MLPs”) moving into the 21st century. The topic has been the subject of widespread coverage in the financial press 
over the last year, and represents an interesting research area both from a practitioner and academic point of view.  
This paper approaches the subject from both angles, dividing the paper roughly into two parts. Part one consists of a 
qualitative assessment of how regulatory modifications and innovations in the MLP structure with regards to 
governance and tax treatment have allowed for a wider set of assets within the energy complex to exploit the MLP 
structure. Part two approaches the subject from an academic point of view, and examines the phenomenon of initial 
public offering (“IPO”) underpricing in the context of MLPs. For both parts, a sample of 100 MLP IPOs launched in 
the period from 1994 through November 2012 has been used. 
Moving from the early MLPs in the 1980s to the asset class’ revival during the 2000s, I find that the MLP regulatory 
and business environment, investor mix, and asset diversity have changed. Contrasting to “traditional” MLPs, an 
increasing proportion of growth oriented firms with more volatile cash flows have entered the space, as have more 
leveraged firms. I thus find that MLPs are becoming less of an asset class per se, with deviations from the norm 
appearing quite frequently.  
In the second part of my analysis I find that MLP IPOs are underpriced. The results are interesting because they 
contrast to previous research, and hence represent an addition to the current literature on IPO underpricing. For the 
full sample of 100 MLP IPOs, I find that the average initial return is 5.51 per cent. When dividing the sample into 
two groups containing pre-2004 and post-2004 IPOs respectively, I find that the average initial return for IPOs 
launched prior to 2004 is 1.73 per cent, and insignificantly different from zero. For the post-2004 IPOs, average 
initial return is 6.36 per cent, and significantly larger than zero. I associate the shift in underpricing with the passing 
of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which introduced institutional ownership as a more meaningful source 
of financing for MLPs. On theoretical grounds, the shift in underpricing is consistent with the winner’s curse 
hypothesis. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1   Topic Description and Motivation 
This paper explores the development of the relatively young and emerging asset class of Master Limited Partnerships 
(“MLPs”) moving into the 21st century. The topic carries a sense of timeliness as it has been the subject of 
widespread coverage in the financial press over the last year, and represents an interesting research area both from a 
practitioner and academic point of view. I will attempt to approach the subject from both angles, dividing the paper 
roughly into two parts. Specifically, I will first make a qualitative assessment of how regulatory modifications and 
innovations in the MLP structure with regards to governance and tax treatment have allowed for a wider set of assets 
within the energy complex to exploit the structure. Second, I will use data sampled for the first part to address 
implications for academic research. Specifically, I examine the phenomenon of Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) 
underpricing in the context of MLPs, and compare results with early MLP research conducted with data from the 
1980s. 
From a practitioner point of view, the MLP structure is relevant for a number of reasons. Over the last decade, the 
MLP has resurfaced as an asset class after a popularity trough in the 1990s, and attracted the attention of investors, 
investment banking advisors, owners of energy related assets, and even politicians.  
After three post-financial crisis rounds of quantitative easing in the United States (“U.S.”), U.S. Treasury Notes are 
now trading at record low yields, forcing yield seeking investors to look elsewhere to place their capital. Coinciding 
with this development, the MLP asset class, which is known for its yield enhancing characteristics, has outperformed 
both regular stock market indices and related asset classes such as utilities and Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(“REITs”). 
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Figure 1. Coincidental? U.S. Treasury Notes Trade at Record Low Yields – Alerian MLP Index1 
Outperforms2  
 
In equity capital markets, 2012 saw the successful closing of 13 operating MLP IPOs3, raising USD 2.9 billion in 
gross proceeds, and providing USD 180 million in underwriting fees and commissions to investment banks4. In 
2011, 13 IPOs raised USD 2.4 billion, leaving USD 156 million with banks. Currently, the asset class comprises 
approximately 100 operating MLPs, implying that roughly a quarter of existing firms has come to market over the 
last two years. It should be noted that this quite substantial issuing activity has come hand in hand with the discovery 
of immense unconventional oil and gas plays across the U.S.. These discoveries represent real growth opportunities 
for firms operating in the energy infrastructure segment, and translate directly into demand for projects that favour 
MLP financing.  
From a regulator point of view, the success of the structure in its current form is manifested by political efforts to 
expand its use into other industries, such as renewables5. The structure has proved ample in funnelling capital into 
energy infrastructure projects, which are capital intensive by nature, and important for securing future U.S. domestic 
                                                             
1 The Alerian MLP Index was registered in 1996, and was the first index to track the performance of MLPs. The index is considered a 
benchmark for the MLP space, and is a composite index constructed based on the 50 most prominent energy MLPs. The Alerian MLP Index 
is calculated using a float-adjusted, capitalisation-weighted methodology.  
2 The graph to the left tracks the yield development from January 2002 to November 2012 for U.S. Treasury Notes with 5, 10 and 20 years 
to maturity respectively. The graph to the right tracks the price performance of the S&P 500 Composite Index (SPX), the Alerian MLP 
index (AMZ) and the FTSE NAREIT Real Estate 50 Index (FTY:US). Sources: U.S. Department of Treasury, Bloomberg. 
3 In 2012, three financial MLPs also commenced public trading in their units. These are The Carlyle Group LP, Oaktree Capital Group LLC, 
and Sandridge Mississippian Trust II. 
4 Aggregates are computed based on company prospectuses for 12 of the 13 IPOs. One IPO, Natural Resource Partners LP, was executed by 
allocating units on a pro-rata basis to existing unit holders of the parent. 
5 Two bills have been passed in 2012 requesting that income derived from renewable energy sources be included as MLP qualifying income 
under the IRC Section 7704(d). Senator Coons introduced the first bill in June 2012 (S. 3275: Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act), 
followed by a similar bill introduced by Congressmen Poe and Thompson in September 2012 (H.R. 6437: Master Limited Partnerships 
Parity Act). 
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energy supply. By allowing the structure for firms with income sourced from renewable energy projects, it is the 
hope of sponsors that it will benefit the U.S. in developing more sustainable energy sources.  
Evidently, as demonstrated by the above mentioned trends, the MLP has become “too big to ignore” from a 
practitioner perspective. Through its dominant presence in energy infrastructure in the U.S., it is also an example of 
how business structures matter in society, and hence a relevant topic to explore for any student of corporate finance. 
In terms of research, I find that the most relevant topic to explore is that of structure innovation; how different 
projects with different business characteristics have been able to benefit from using the MLP as an investment 
vehicle.  
In terms of literature, research related to innovative uses of the MLP structure is fairly limited. Ciccotello and 
Muscarella (2003) describe some innovations involving the Limited Liability Company (“LLC”) and MLP forms 
that enabled the structure to become a suitable investment vehicle for institutional investors in the early 2000s. Their 
paper explores how innovative underwriting, demonstrated by the offering of Kinder Morgan Management LLC, 
gave institutions an opportunity to circumvent regulations prohibiting MLP investments for regulated investment 
companies. To my knowledge however, no papers have examined innovations that have allowed for a more diverse 
asset acceptance into the MLP space. As Ciccotello and Muscarella (2003) explain, certain assets have traditionally 
been more suitable for the structure than others: “Both tax and agency considerations suggest that MLPs should hold 
assets that produce steady cash. MLPs are a poor fit for operations with volatile cash flow. In the energy industry, 
that translates to the use of MLPs for the “mid-stream” assets – namely distribution and storage. The corporate 
form is better suited for the volatile ‘tails’ exploration and retail”. Illustrated by recent IPOs, the first part of this 
paper seeks to explain how innovations in the MLP structure have now also made it suitable for “volatile tail” assets 
within the energy complex. 
From an academic point of view, the topic presents an opportunity to add to existing literature on the underpricing of 
IPOs. To my knowledge, there are only two papers discussing the underpricing of MLP IPOs, namely those of 
Muscarella (1988), and of Michaely and Shaw (1994). Contrasting to established results in finance literature, 
Muscarella reports that he finds no significant underpricing for a sample of 50 IPOs in the time span from 1983 to 
1987. While Muscarella does not attempt to reason the deviation, he does state that the evidence suggests that 
“investors have no uncertainty about the value of the MLP units and thus are able to price the issue correctly”. 
There might be some truth to this statement, as many MLPs are formed by way of listing assets or divisions 
previously held by publicly traded corporations. When such assets have already been indirectly priced by the market, 
it is likely that investors will feel less uncertain about their value as the assets are carved out of the parent 
corporation, and listed as a separate entity. Still, many MLPs are formed by way of listing privately held assets or 
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through new firms launching IPOs, which lends to thinking that an alternative explanation can be found. Michaely 
and Shaw presents one such explanation in their 1994 paper, where they also report no significant underpricing for a 
sample of 59 MLP IPOs launched from 1984 to 1988. The authors test several models, and find that the evidence is 
consistent with the winner’s curse hypothesis. The winner’s curse hypothesis stems from the work of Rock (1986), 
and is part of a substantial strand of underpricing literature focusing on asymmetric information between IPO-
participating agents. In Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse model, asymmetric information across investor classes is what 
necessitates underpricing. Rock (1986) assumes that there are two types of investors; the first consisting of outside 
investors who are better informed about the issuing firm’s value than the issuer and the underwriter, and the second 
of outside investors who are less informed. Acknowledging the advantage of the informed investor, the uninformed 
investor rationally fears that on average, he will not profit from participating in IPOs. As the informed investor will 
only bid on underpriced IPOs, such allocations will be rationed between the two groups. In overpriced IPOs 
however, informed investors will not participate, and the uninformed investor will receive full allocations. 
Consequently, the average return to the uninformed investor, conditional on the allocation of shares, will be lower 
than the unconditional return, and possibly negative. Rock’s (1986) model further assumes that it is important for 
issuing firms to keep the uniformed investors in the market, as informed investors do not have the amount of capital 
necessary to absorb all IPOs. In order to maintain uninformed investor participation, underpricing is thus viewed as 
an equilibrium requirement, bringing average return to a break even. Michaely and Shaw (1994) link the two types 
of investors in Rock’s model to institutional and retail investors, which are assumed to be relatively better and less 
informed respectively. The apparent absence of underpricing of MLP IPOs is further associated with the lack of 
institutional interest in the MLP space, and hence less information asymmetry. 
During the 1980s, institutional investors were largely deterred from owning MLPs due to restrictive regulations. 
Following Michaely and Shaw’s (1994) line of reasoning, regular retail investors did not face an adverse selection in 
the context of MLP IPOs, and hence did not demand a premium in the form of underpricing to participate in issues. 
Since the 1980s however, the investor mix has changed for MLPs. Most notably, the passing of the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004 made it easier for regulated investment companies to invest directly in MLPs, and brought 
about institutional investors as a more meaningful source of financing. Prior to 2004, MLPs were primarily owned 
by retail investors, with institutions holding only a 10 per cent ownership share. According to Morgan Stanley, 
institutional ownership had reached approximately 32 per cent by the end of 3Q 2012, which means institutional 
ownership was up by more than 200 per cent since 2004. 
In the second part of this paper, I propose a hypothesis that the influx of institutional investors to the MLP space may 
have widened the knowledge level gap between investor classes, or rather, increased information asymmetry. With a 
sample consisting of 100 MLP IPOs from 1994 through November 2012, I test whether the conclusions of 
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Muscarella and Michaely and Shaw still hold. I expect to see that MLPs are now underpriced, and that this potential 
shift can be associated with the passing of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. It is my belief that MLP IPOs 
represent a unique opportunity to test hypotheses that relate to information asymmetry, and that research in this 
direction can help further the understanding of the underpricing phenomenon. 
1.2   Scope and Research Questions 
The objective of this paper is to explore the MLP asset class, and to detect changes that may have occurred as the 
asset class has evolved. I choose to focus my attention on two main problem areas, each of which requires data from 
the prospectuses of MLP IPOs.  
My first scope restriction is to exclude financial MLPs from any data presented in this paper. I define financial MLPs 
as MLPs whose main source of revenue is related to financial advisory, hedge funds, private equity funds, firms 
dealing in mortgage securities, or pure investment trusts.  As much as these firms are MLPs, they display different 
characteristics to operating MLPs, and are less interesting in the context of my research. Thus, when any reference is 
made to MLPs in due course of this paper, only operating MLPs are included. I define operating MLPs as MLPs 
whose main source of revenue is related to the ownership and operation of physical assets. Included in this definition 
are General Partner MLPs, which in essence are levered plays on the underlying MLP in which it owns equity 
interests.  
Further, I will limit my sample scope to MLPs that have been formed over the last 20 years, and record IPO activity 
through November 2012. Any aggregate numbers reported in this paper for 2012 are hence excluding any activity 
that might have occurred on subsequent dates. The motivation underlying the exclusion of 1980s observations is 
largely based on practical challenges related to data availability. 
This paper will seek to answer the following two questions: 
1)  “What is an MLP, and how has regulatory changes and innovative use of the structure allowed for a wider 
set of asset classes within the energy complex to exploit the structure?”  
2) “Are MLP IPOs underpriced, and if so, can this be associated with the influx of institutional ownership 
following the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004?” 
1.3   Structure 
This paper is divided roughly into two parts, which seek to cover relevant issues in the context of MLPs from a 
practitioner and academic point of view respectively.  
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Part one concerns research question number one, and is a qualitative assessment of how the MLP structure has 
developed through time. The first part of the chapter presents the basic characteristics of an MLP, including 
ownership structure, governance and tax treatment. Further, it explains different ways MLPs can be formed, and how 
MLPs are usually valued in practice. As the reader has gained basic knowledge of what an MLP is, the chapter 
moves on to discuss regulatory advances and how the asset class has developed historically. Lastly, data gathered 
from recent IPO prospectuses are presented, along with recent trends in how the structure is being employed in new 
ways by practitioners.  
Part two concerns research question number two, and is an empirical study of the underpricing phenomenon in the 
context of MLPs. For the purpose of understanding the underpricing phenomenon, the first part of the chapter gives a 
brief introduction of the concept of IPOs, including a discussion of the benefits and disadvantages of being publicly 
listed, and of the of IPO process. Subsequently, the underpricing phenomenon is presented, followed by references to 
previous empirical evidence, and a literature review. In line with the research scope of this paper, theories that are 
based on asymmetric information receive relatively more attention in this part. After the literature review, I present 
the empirical analysis. The analysis part is initiated by a presentation of my hypothesis, and followed by a sample 
description and methodology for running relevant tests. Results are then presented along with criticisms and a 
discussion of implications. Lastly, I have also chosen to include some concluding remarks with suggestions for 
further research. 
2 Master Limited Partnerships – A Qualitative Assessment of the Development of an Asset 
Class 
In this chapter, I explore the development of MLPs as an asset class moving into the 21st century. The chapter looks 
at MLPs from a practitioner point of view, and seeks to detect how asset owners can tweak the MLP structure to 
allow for “unconventional” assets to enter the MLP space. Ciccotello and Muscarella (2003) provide the following 
explanation to why certain assets have traditionally been favoured by the MLP structure: “Both tax and agency 
considerations suggest that MLPs should hold assets that produce steady cash. (…) In the energy industry, that 
translates to the use of MLPs for the “mid-stream” 6 assets – namely distribution and storage. The corporate form is 
better suited for the volatile “tails” exploration and retail”.  
                                                             
6 The midstream value chain provides the link between the natural resource and the finished product, and generally refers to the gathering, 
treating, processing, transportation, or storage of oil and gas after it has left the well head (upstream), but before it has been distributed to 
the end consumer (downstream). Some typical midstream assets are interstate and intrastate oil and gas pipelines, commodity storage 
facilities, and facilities for gas compression, treating and fractionation. 
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Practitioners have observed two recent IPO trends for MLPs. The first trend is that a variety of different firms are 
going public, introducing a wider set of asset classes within the energy complex. These include firms operating both 
upstream and downstream assets, and also fertilizer and coal producers (for a categorisation of typical MLP assets, 
see Appendix 1). The second, and perhaps more interesting observation, is that “investors are less concerned” with 
what types of assets are contained within the MLP than they have been in the past (Fenn, 2011). Personally, I am a 
bit sceptical with regards to this statement, and believe that there must be a rational explanation to why investors are 
accepting these new assets. I believe that investors are not less concerned, but rather that the firms going public are 
able to tailor the MLP structure to fit their specific businesses. A lawyer at Vinson & Elkins puts it nicely: “If it 
looks like an MLP, and smells like an MLP”… surely it must be an MLP? The main take-away is that not all MLPs 
are created equal. 
I choose to approach this chapter in the following way. First, I will explain what an MLP is, and provide some basic 
background information about the MLP in its current form. I then proceed to put the MLP in historical context, and 
show how the asset class has evolved along the lines of regulatory and market developments. Lastly, I conduct a 
qualitative assessment of how innovative use of the structure might have helped maintain high investor appetite for 
new MLPs. Specifically; I address how the traditional governance and tax treatment of MLPs have been tweaked by 
practitioners to make investors “less concerned” about new types of energy assets. 
2.1   What is a Master Limited Partnership? 
By definition, an MLP is a limited partnership whose equity interests (called units) are traded on an established 
securities market, such as the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) or the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation (“NASDAQ”).  
The MLP has existed in the U.S. as an alternative business structure to the corporation7 since the early 1980s, but 
was not officially “created” until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and Revenue Act of 1987 were passed. Among other 
things, the legislation limited the structure to firms that derive a minimum 90 per cent of revenue from qualifying 
sources, such as real estate and natural resources. As a result, a majority of MLPs have historically been focused 
within natural resources, dominated by firms in the midstream segment. This was also the intention of regulators; by 
allowing energy firms access to the attractive MLP structure, regulators hoped that it would incentivise investors to 
funnel capital into infrastructure projects that traditionally had yielded low returns to corporations, and hence 
improve domestic energy infrastructure.  
                                                             
7 In this paper, the term corporation refers to the C-corporation, as differentiated from the S-corporation. The C-corporation and S-
corporation are two different corporate forms in the United States. For federal tax purposes, C-corporations are governed by the subchapter 
C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, while S-corporations are governed by subchapter S. A C-corporation is characterised by the (1) 
continuity of life, (2) centralisation of management, (3) limited liability of owners, and (4) transferability of equity interests.  
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In essence, the MLP is considered an attractive business structure for investors because it combines the favourable 
tax treatment (pass through) of a partnership with the business development advantages of a corporation. Due to the 
pass through tax treatment, an MLP pays no entity level tax. Consequently, it avoids double taxation on distributions 
(often compared to corporate dividends even though they are considered return of capital for tax purposes), which 
makes the MLP favour assets that enable large and stable distributions. In this paper, assets that meet the success 
criteria for cash flow stability are thus termed “traditional” MLP assets. Such assets usually have low operational 
risk, low maintenance capital expenditures, and low exposure to commodity prices. In addition, high barriers to entry 
or protective regulations are considered preferential. The above criteria are almost an exact description of many 
midstream assets, such as pipelines. It is then interesting to see, as will be reported later, that a lot of new MLPs have 
assets that do not meet these criteria. These assets typically have higher exposure to commodity prices and 
seasonality in sales, less regulated business environments, and higher operational risk. In this paper, such assets are 
thus termed “unconventional” MLP assets. 
Before moving on to discuss how the MLP asset class has evolved for investors to accept unconventional assets, I 
will present some structural features that are unique to the MLP, and important for further analysis. Similar to the 
corporation, the MLP has unlimited life, and offers investors limited liability8 and transferability in equity interests. 
With regard to ownership structure, governance and tax treatment however, the MLP is very different.  
2.1.1   Ownership Structure  
The ownership structure of an MLP typically consists of a decision-making General Partner (“GP”) and passive-
investor Limited Partners (“LPs”). The GP is the manager of the MLP, and holds a minority equity interest which 
typically amounts to 2 per cent. The remainder 98 per cent of the equity is owned by LPs, whose main function in 
the partnership is to contribute capital. In return, LPs receive quarterly cash distributions from the MLP. LP units are 
generally owned by outside public investors, but may also be held by a corporate parent (“Parent”), management 
affiliates or other financial investors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 The Revenue Procedure 89-12 establishes certain requirements for the General Partner of the MLP in order to give Limited Partners 
limited liability. Specifically, the General Partner must maintain a net worth of 10 per cent of contributions made to the MLP, excluding the 
value of contributions made by the GP for equity interests in the MLP (Omer and Terando, 1999; Boyd et al., 1997). 
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Figure 2. Hypothetical MLP Ownership Structure 
 
Upon the IPO of an MLP, it is normal that up to 49 per cent of the equity is sold to outside investors in the form of 
common units, while the remainder is retained by the GP or Parent in the form of either common or subordinated 
units. In general, neither LP unit class has any voting rights with regard to the operations of the MLP; they differ 
only with respect to eligibility for cash distributions. Subordinated units are not eligible for distributions until 
common units have received targeted distributions. This provides IPO investors with a “yield insurance” feature for a 
period of time following the IPO. Subordinated units are typically convertible at a one-for-one basis after a 
predefined number of years however, or when distributions paid to common unit holders have reached a predefined 
hurdle, as defined in the IPO prospectus.  
As an MLP is not legally required to have a board of directors, the GP also has sole discretion with regards to any 
financial or strategic decisions. Consequently, the GP essentially assumes both governance and management 
functions. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that when governance and control functions are centred in one entity, this 
person or group should also be the residual owner. In the case of MLPs, this is attempted through the GP assuming 
unlimited liability for the MLP’s debt obligations (Omer and Terando, 1999). With LPs holding no voting rights 
with regards to operations however, there are many other potential conflicts of interest that can arise. How the MLP 
structure deals with such conflicts is discussed in the following subchapter.  
2.1.2   Governance and the Partnership Agreement 
The governance mechanism of an MLP differs conceptually from that of a corporation. Most notably, an MLP is not 
legally required to have a board of directors. In its place, an MLP is required to draft a Partnership Agreement 
(“PA”) prior to the IPO which ensures that the interests of management and investors are adequately aligned. The PA 
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is a required part of the IPO prospectus, and the major governing mechanism in a partnership (Ciccotello and 
Muscarella, 2000). Specifically, the PA outlines the rights and duties of management and investors through detailing 
operating and financial policies, and through specifying managerial rights. Investors can agree to the terms either 
directly through signing a copy of the PA, or indirectly (most often) through purchasing units in the MLP IPO. Most 
provisions in the PA have become quite standardised, but the investor needs to pay attention to special features when 
assessing the investment story. Having a PA is useful in that it allows management to tailor governance controls to 
fit the MLP’s strategy and environment. For an investor, the PA establishment is perhaps well illustrated by the 
words of Thomas Jefferson: “The exact amount of tyranny you will live under is the amount you put up with”. 
There are several issues to take into consideration when drafting the PA. In general, the MLP should seek to adjust 
the contractual design of the PA to suit its business strategy and environment in order to reduce agency costs (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). For example, if an MLP faces few valid growth opportunities and little uncertainty, it is in the 
interest of investors to place restrictions in the PA on how managers are allowed to use the firm’s cash flows. Jensen 
(1986), among others, points out that overinvestment in mature industries can harm investors, and that the corporate 
form is unsuitable to industry cash cows9. Without restrictions on management spending discretion, cash rich firms 
may pursue investments that are the result of management’s personal ambitions and not in the best interest of 
investors. The PA gives the firm an opportunity to minimise any such conflicts of interest, and Kensinger and Martin 
(1988) argues that partly as result of this, the MLP was an appropriate vehicle for “quiet restructuring” in slow-
growth industries during the 1980s.  The opposite situation arises if the MLP is facing promising growth prospects in 
its operating environment. Then, it might be in the interest of investors to allow management more flexibility, and to 
incentivise desired behaviour through appropriate performance rewards. 
Ciccotello and Muscarella (2000) analyse a sample of 119 MLP PAs in the time period from 1981 to 1995. For the 
post-1988 MLPs, they find that provisions that are normally made in the PAs include terms for the removal of the 
GP, withdrawal restrictions for the GP, GP ability to amend the PA, cash distribution policy, and incentive 
distribution rights (“IDRs”) policy. Interestingly, the authors also find that PA provisions have changed over time, 
with scope restrictions and GP ability to compete with the MLP being more frequently made prior to 1988, and 
distribution policy and IDRs less frequently made. The authors raise the question of whether the increase in 
distribution policy provisions after 1988 came as a result of a change in the way MLPs were valued in the market. In 
the late 1980s, there was a trend for MLPs to increasingly being valued based on yield. By providing clear guides to 
yield in the PA, MLPs hence played on the market trend, perhaps eyeing higher valuations. Other contractual terms 
                                                             
9 The term “cash cow” uses the dairy cow as a metaphor for firms with certain characteristics. Typically, a cash cow firm requires an initial 
capital outlay, and subsequently produces steady cash flows over the course of its life with minimal capital requirements. Such firms usually 
will have few profitable growth opportunities, and best serves the interest of investors by paying out cash, either through repurchases of 
equity interests or direct distributions. 
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that only a few PAs addressed include debt level restrictions, GP ability to issue senior equity, and pre-emptive 
rights, including the right of existing owners to participate in future equity issues on a pro rata basis.  
Essentially, the PA can address any concerns that investors may have, and align the interests of the GP and LPs 
through a tailored approach. For example, if the owners of the GP have a shorter investment horizon than outside 
investors, a conflict of interest could arise with regards to new investment decisions. This might be the case if the 
owner of the GP is a private equity fund or venture capitalist who is looking for a prompt exit opportunity. Without 
any governing mechanism, it is then highly likely that the GP will push the MLP to execute risky, short-term 
accretive acquisitions at the expense of long-term cash flow stability. With no voting power, LPs are clearly 
vulnerable in this setting if the PA does not provide any protection. One way the PA can protect LP interests when 
governance control is limited, is to define the scope of operations for the MLP. By restricting the scope of 
operations, managerial discretion in the face of making new investments becomes limited. Ciccotello and Muscarella 
(2000) report that MLPs that limit operating scope also actually tend to perform better. The authors state that when 
managers focus their efforts on predefined tasks, this may lead to efficiency gains in asset management. A second 
and more common way to limit managerial discretion is to establish a distribution policy in the PA. In this setting, 
the distribution policy functions as a disciplining mechanism. By regularly draining the MLP for cash, management 
has to turn to capital markets in order to afford making new investments. This ensures that all investments made are 
“approved” by investors before they are executed; if the investment is not regarded attractive, investors will not 
purchase equity, and creditors will not provide debt financing. 
The distribution policy is usually showcased in great detail, including distribution target levels, unit class distribution 
eligibility terms, and whether or not the GP is entitled to IDRs. IDRs give the GP rights to a disproportionate share 
of the incremental increase in quarterly distributions, and can essentially be regarded as performance fees. The 
function of IDRs is to encourage management to grow distributions for investors, be it through organic growth, asset 
acquisitions from the Parent (“dropdowns”), or third-party acquisitions. For example, if an MLP with 100 million 
units outstanding (102.04 million including GP units when LP units make up 98 per cent of equity) targets a 
quarterly distribution of USD 0.375 per unit, but is able to pay out an extraordinary USD 0.7 per unit, the initial 
USD 38.3 million will be allocated on a pro-rata basis, while the incremental payments will be allocated at a 
percentage disproportionate to equity ownership shares. Employing the distribution policy of Delek Logistics 
Partners LP in the below table, the previous example would imply that 21.7 per cent of total distributions would be 
allocated to the GP despite only 2 per cent equity ownership. 
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Table 1. Incentive Distribution Rights Structure – A Hypothetical Example10 
Declared Distribution Rate and Units Outstanding     
Distribution per Unit (USD) 0.7     
Units Outstanding (million), excl. GP Units 100     
        
Distribution Tiers (USD)   LP share GP share 
First Tier 0.375 98 % 2 % 
Second Tier 0.43125 85 % 15 % 
Third Tier 0.46875 75 % 25 % 
Fourth Tier 0.5625 50 % 50 % 
        
Allocation by Tier (USD million)   LP GP 
First Tier   37.5 0.8 
Second Tier   5.6 1.0 
Third Tier   3.8 1.3 
Fourth Tier   13.8 13.8 
Total   60.6 16.8 
        
Allocation of Total Cash Distributed (USD million)     
Limited Partners   60.6 78.3 % 
General Partner with IDRs   16.8 21.7 % 
Total   77.4 100 % 
 
Despite IDRs incentivising the GP to grow distributions for investors, there are also disadvantages attached to IDRs. 
When the MLP asset base is grown to a level where high-splits (50/50) are triggered upon distribution payments, the 
cost of GP capital increases, and with it the weighted cost of capital for the MLP. With a higher cost of capital, new 
acquisitions will require higher marginal cash flows to be profitable, and thus limit the competitiveness of the MLP 
in making acquisitions. It is quite the paradox really, that the very IDRs that are established to incentivise growth 
actually also establishes a hinder to growth beyond a certain distribution level. For growth oriented MLPs, the 
drafting of IDR policy is hence of utmost importance. In any case, a growth oriented MLP should consider 
establishing PA provisions that allow the GP to amend the IDR policy at a later stage in the life of the MLP. Should 
top-tier distributions be triggered ahead of a promising growth period, the GP will then be entitled to act on behalf of 
investors and lower IDR allocations to the GP to reduce capital cost.  
Alternatively, the MLP can also think of the PA as a means to attract more outside investors or specific types of 
investors. Ciccotello and Muscarella (2000) report that MLPs with PAs that are protective of investors tend to have a 
lower proportion of insider ownership, and vice versa. Having an investor-friendly PA can hence act as a substitute 
                                                             
10 The IDR structure is sampled from Delek Logistics Partners LP’s IPO prospectus. Available from: 
[http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/filing.ashx?filingid=8498120] (downloaded 03.11.2012). 
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for insider retention, and allow for a more dispersed ownership structure, and for a larger share of equity financed by 
outside investors.  
To sum up, the MLP is very different from the corporation when it comes to governance. The PA, as the main 
governing mechanism, allows the individual MLP to tailor governance controls to suit its business strategy and 
environment. Ciccotello and Muscarella (2000) present evidence that contractual terms set out in the PA actually is 
related to how MLPs perform, and how their ownership structures are. Although certain PA provisions have become 
standard for most MLPs, there is nothing that says new MLPs have to adhere to traditional norms. There is room for 
innovative solutions, which can make the structure a more viable alternative to firms with unconventional assets.  
2.1.3   Tax Treatment  
For tax purposes, the MLP is considered a pass through entity, which means it is exempt from entity level taxation11. 
Instead, items of income, gain, loss, deduction and credit are passed directly through to unit holders on a pro-rata 
basis, and taxed at their respective individual income tax rates12. This pass through treatment of items makes the 
MLP avoid double taxation on income distributed to investors, and has traditionally been considered to have 
provided much of the rationale for the emergence of MLPs (Ciccotello and Muscarella, 2003). For example, if the 
individual income tax rate is 35 per cent, individual dividend tax rate is 15 per cent and the corporate income tax rate 
is 35 per cent, corporate investors will pay a marginal 44.75 per cent tax on cash dividends, while the MLP investors 
only pay 35 per cent on pro-rata attributable income. The marginal tax paid on cash flows to investors for a 
corporation is higher because operational income first needs to be taxed at the corporate level, and then a second 
time at the individual’s dividend tax rate. For investors holding MLP units, pro-rata net income is taxed once at the 
individual income tax rate. Distributions on the other hand are considered as return of capital and generally not 
subject to tax, depending on the basis of the units held. As a result, a common saying about MLPs is that they 
provide investors with tax deferred distributions. Depending on the tax shields an MLP receive from for example 
depreciation and amortisation, the net income taxable for investors can be as low as 10 to 20 per cent of the 
distributions received on an annual basis. The basis of an MLP unit is normally equivalent to the price at which it 
was purchased by the investor. Adjustments are made to the basis to account for pass through items, debt and 
                                                             
11 IRC Section 7704(c)(2) exempts publicly traded partnerships from entity level taxation, provided the entity derives a minimum 90 per 
cent of gross income from qualifying income sources, defined in Section 7704(d)(1). Qualifying income includes interests, dividends, real 
property rents, and income and gains derived from the exploration, development, mining or production, processing, refining, transportation 
(including pipelines transporting gas, oil or products thereof), or the marketing of any mineral or natural resource (including fertilizer, 
geothermal energy and timber), industrial source carbon dioxide, or the storage and transportation of certain alternative fuels. The Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) further releases Private Letter Rulings (“PLRs”) on a regular basis, clarifying the scope of qualifying income for 
MLPs. Over the last 5 years, the IRS has published 40 PLRs, including the definition of income from cancellation of debt (“COD”) related 
to qualifying income producing assets as qualifying income. 
12 Individual income tax rates currently range from 15 to 35 per cent, depending on the individual’s income bracket. 
20 
 
distributions of cash13. On aggregate, the basis is adjusted upwards for taxable income, and downwards for cash 
distributions. If the basis reaches zero, distributions are taxable at the capital gains tax rate. In the event that the MLP 
passes through a loss, the investor is subject to passive loss limitation rules14. Unlike other securities, losses passed 
on from an MLP cannot be offset against other income, but must be offset from income derived from the same entity 
(Jones et al., 2008). In the event the investor should sell the unit after receiving tax deferred distributions, the 
investor will have to pay income tax on the amount of capital returned on the initial basis. For a simple example, see 
the calculations in the below figure. 
Table 2. Taxable Income to Distributions – A Hypothetical Example15 
  Unit 
Purchase 
        Sell Unit            
At End Of           
  Price Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
MLP unit price (USD) 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Annual distribution per unit (USD) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Distribution yield (%) 5.0 % 4.8 % 4.5 % 4.3 % 4.2 % 4.0 % 
% of distribution tax deferred (tax shield) 80 %           
Ordinary personal income tax rate 35 %           
Capital gains tax rate 15 %           
Tax deferred portion of distribution   0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Taxable portion of distributions   0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Tax paid at year-end on distributions (at 35%)   0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Cost basis for the MLP unit 20 19.2 18.4 17.6 16.8 16 
              
Tax paid when units are sold at the end of year 5             
Capital gains tax paid (on unit price increase from USD 20 
to USD 25) 
0.75 
          
          
Ordinary income tax paid (on "return of capital" - 
reduction in investor's cost basis from USD 20 to USD 16) 
1.4 
          
          
Tax paid on year 5 distribution 0.07           
              
Total tax paid at the end of year 5 2.22           
 
Intuitively, the lower marginal tax paid on cash flows to investors should put the MLP structure at a cost of capital 
advantage to similarly situated corporations. One can argue that with a lower cost of capital, MLPs should hence 
ceteris paribus be able to either (1) pay more for acquisitions than a corporation and realise the same cash flow 
growth, or (2) realise more cash flow growth at the same acquisition price.  
                                                             
13 For a detailed description of basis adjustments, see IRC Sections 705, 732, 733, 752, and Treasury Regulations section 1.752-3(a). 
14 For a detailed description of passive loss limitations for MLP unit holders, see IRC Section 469(k). 
15 Wells Fargo Securities (2010) 
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Collins and Bey (1986) point out however, that partnership tax treatment does not always put the MLP at an 
advantage to corporations. For example, if a company is in a growth phase that requires high income retention rates, 
or if the personal marginal tax rate is much higher than the corporate tax rate, then the MLP structure might actually 
be worse for the investor from an after-tax cash flow perspective. Corporations can also assimilate MLP after-tax 
cash flows by having a more leveraged capital structure, as illustrated by Scholes and Wolfson (1992). Corporations 
paying entity level income tax can deduct interest expenses from operating income, and hence reduce the tax 
burden16 for the firm. And indeed, as documented in previous literature, corporations do tend to have more debt than 
MLPs. Omer and Terando (1999) build on existing literature (Jaffe, 1991; Guenther, 1992; Shaw and Weir, 1993; 
Gentry, 1994) when exploring differences in capital structure across organisational forms. Examining a sample of 95 
MLPs and matched corporations, Omer and Terando (1999) find that the combination of relatively higher business 
risk and GP unlimited liability for MLP debt is a significant factor in explaining capital structure differences. 
According to Omer and Terando (1999), the goal of the GP is to be “in a position similar to limited partners by 
increasing the probability that, in the event of LP liquidation, its loss exposure will not exceed its unrecovered equity 
investment”. If the MLP is already risky by nature, for example through exposure to volatile commodity prices, it is 
predicted that the GP will seek to reduce debt in the MLP capital structure.  
For the MLP, having partnership status for tax purposes also poses some costly administrative challenges. First of 
all, since the income of the MLP is to be taxed on the hands of the investors, the MLP incurs a lot of extra costs 
related to tax reporting. Guenther (1992) observes that the extra cost associated with tax reporting can consume as 
much as two per cent of revenues. When Apache Petroleum Company filed to convert back to corporate form in 
1988, one of the main motivations was to reduce administrative costs. According to a letter to unitholders, Apache 
Petroleum Company estimated that it could save USD 4 million annually, which represented 2.58 per cent of revenue 
(Moore et al., 1989). Further, the cost burden from administrative work will be even larger if the MLP elects to be 
treated according to Section 754 in the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). Under this section, unitholders can adjust 
their basis for tax purposes to equal the price the unit was purchased at. Section 754 election hence requires the MLP 
to track all trading in its units, including when units are traded, to what price, and what the outstanding basis was at 
the time it was traded. Without going further into the technicalities of the process, it is clear that in a market where 
thousands of units are traded every day, the information gathering requirements are substantial. Moving into the 21st 
century however, the administrative burden has become lesser with the development of better technological 
solutions.  
                                                             
16 The tax benefit from having a more debt in the capital structure is often called having an interest tax shield in finance literature. MLPs do 
not benefit from debt in the same way as corporations, as the MLP does not pay entity level income tax. 
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Similarly, investors also incur higher costs related to tax reporting from investing in MLPs. For unit holders in the 
U.S., LP status involves the receipt of a Schedule K-1 detailing the partner’s pro-rata share of MLP income, gain, 
loss, deduction and credit for the purpose of tax reporting. For the individual investor, this may pose an 
administrative challenge, as the K-1 form is considered to be much more complex than the regular Form 1099. For 
foreign investors, the process is even more cumbersome, and generally, non-U.S. investors might be better off 
holding instruments that track the performance of MLPs instead of the actual MLP itself. For example, if a foreign 
investor owns shares in a hedge fund that invests in MLPs, any flow through income that is “effectively connected” 
with U.S. trade or business is subject to U.S. federal income tax. According to EisnerAmber, a U.S. accounting firm, 
such effectively connected income transfers can be avoided under certain safe-harbour trading exemptions, but this is 
not the case for MLP income. Ultimately the fund has to withhold tax on behalf of the foreign investor, and the 
foreign investor might eventually end up having to file U.S. income tax returns in addition to the tax returns filed in 
the investor’s home country. 
The partnership tax treatment also bears special consequences for investors that are already tax exempt entities, such 
as pension plans or charitable organisations. These investors will not receive the regular benefits that individuals do, 
as income derived from MLPs (as for any partnership, S-corporation or pass through limited liability company) is 
considered so-called unrelated business taxable income (“UBTI”)17. If the tax exempt entity receives more than USD 
1,000 in UBTI, it will have to file a Form 990-T and pay income tax on the overshooting amount. Consequently, the 
tax motivation for investing in an MLP diminishes, and the investor might be better off investing on an individual 
basis.  
Prior to the passing of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, income from MLPs was also considered UBTI for 
registered investment companies (“RICs”), such as mutual funds. RICs are only allowed to receive 10 per cent of 
income from UBTI, so investments in MLPs were fairly limited. After the act, the UBTI classification was removed 
for RICs, which made MLP investments more relevant to these entities. Presently, RICs can receive an unlimited 
amount of income from MLPs, subject to certain holding limitations. Today, RICs are permitted to place 25 per cent 
of fund values in MLPs, and are restricted to a maximum 10 per cent ownership share in any one MLP.  
To conclude, MLPs enjoy pass through taxation and are hence exempt from entity level taxation. This lowers the 
cost of capital to the firm compared to similarly situated corporations, and puts the MLP at a competitive position for 
asset growth through acquisitions. Despite the evident benefits derived from favourable tax treatment, costs related 
to more complex tax reporting may be substantial both for the MLP and for the individual investor. Before electing 
                                                             
17 For a detailed description of unrelated business taxable income, see IRC Section 511-514 (unrelated business taxable income rule for 
partnerships is in section 512(c)), or IRS Publication 598, “Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations”, available from: 
[http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p598.pdf]. Downloaded 13.11.2012. 
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to be treated as a partnership for tax purposes, the firm should hence consider the cost-benefit trade-offs related to 
tax, also with regards to target investors. In some instances, for example if the firm does not have any business in the 
U.S., or if it is targeting mainly non-U.S. or institutional investors, an alternative solution could be superior to the 
traditional MLP structure.  
2.2   How is a Master Limited Partnership Formed? 
There are several different ways to form an MLP. The most common types are termed the roll-up, dropdown, 
acquisition, conversion, and IPO method. Depending on the method used, the decision to assume the MLP structure 
is motivated by different cost-benefit evaluations. The different methods with underlying motivations are briefly 
discussed in the following. 
The first, and most common method during the 1980s, is the roll-up (Muscarella, 1988). In a roll-up, two or more 
existing partnerships decide to go together and form a new MLP. In this transaction, the owners of non-traded 
partnership units contribute assets from the old partnerships into the new MLP, and receive units in the MLP 
matching the share of their contribution. The transaction may or may not result in the complete liquidation of the 
contributing partnerships. The motivation for non-traded partnerships to form an MLP is multi-faceted.  The method 
provides risk reduction and diversification for the contributing owners. Further, owners get better liquidity in their 
units, and hence a better chance of realising wealth through selling units through the exchange. Lastly, the old 
partnerships that don’t liquidate might enjoy better access to capital markets. 
The second and perhaps most common type of MLP formation today, is the dropdown (also called rollout in some 
papers) method, which is similar to equity carve-outs. In this transaction, a Parent sponsor contributes a division or 
specific assets from its existing business into the new MLP, including any debt attached to the assets. In return, the 
parent receives GP interest, and often also LP units for the overshooting value. Sometimes, the MLP will 
alternatively establish intra-company debt related to the acquisition, which can be paid back using proceeds from the 
offering. In a dropdown transaction, the most normal way to carry out the IPO is for the MLP to issue units to the 
public. In this way, the sale of units is considered a primary offering, and hence a non-taxable event for the MLP. 
Alternatively, existing owners may concomitantly sell some seasoned units, and claim proceeds at their own benefit. 
Gains from these units are generally subject to tax however, as a seasoned equity sale is considered a taxable event. 
A third method is to distribute the new equity to existing owners of the Parent, making the transaction more similar 
to a corporate spinoff. The primary motivation for corporations to shift assets into the MLP form is often associated 
with the immediate gains from tax exemption. Moore et al. (1989) study the valuation effect of shifting assets from a 
corporate structure into an MLP, and find that for a sample of 7 dropdowns during the period 1982 to 1987, MLPs 
experience a significant positive average price reaction at 2.41 per cent, or 30.4 per cent per dollar of assets dropped 
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down. For 5 spinoffs in the same time period, the positive price reaction averaged 6.41 per cent, or 20.8 per cent 
return per dollar of assets spun off. Moore et al. (1989) posit that the abnormal positive gain for dropdowns and 
spinoffs of corporate assets is consistent with (1) MLP tax advantages, (2) reduction of free cash flow, (3) 
information signalling, (4) reduced information asymmetry, and (5) improved efficiency of asset management. 
Improved valuations based on reduced information asymmetry and better asset management is consistent with results 
found for corporate equity carve-outs (Schipper and Smith, 1986) and spinoffs (Hite and Owers, 1983; Schipper and 
Smith, 1983). In addition to improved valuations, the Parent also keeps control over the assets through GP 
ownership, receives LP units that provide cash inflows at a regular basis, reduce debt on its balance sheet, and may 
realise part of the asset value immediately. As such, the dropdown method can be a smart financing tool for the 
Parent, and also benefit investors by realising fair valuations for assets that have previously been discounted in a 
more diversified business unit. For example, when midstream assets such as pipelines are held by oil majors or 
refiners, they may be underutilised and undervalued as they are not the focus of management, and might not even be 
run for profit. Dropping such assets down into an MLP will likely increase valuation, as the new entity will have 
both the incentive, expertise and focus necessary to manage the assets efficiently. 
A third method is the acquisition method. Here, the parent corporation will form an MLP, issue units to the public, 
and use the proceeds to acquire assets from a third party. In essence, the transaction is quite similar to the dropdown; 
the parent retains GP interest, and proceeds are used to finance the assets. However, in this transaction the parent 
acts more as an intermediary between the MLP and the selling party, and can charge a fee from the MLP for locating 
the assets and negotiating the acquisition. 
A fourth way to form an MLP is for a traditional corporation to perform a complete conversion into partnership 
form. In this transaction, major shareholders or officers are likely to adopt the role of GP, while LP units are 
allocated to existing owners in exchange for outstanding shares. A corporate conversion is most likely motivated by 
the partnership tax treatment, and has been proven to spark immediate abnormal positive returns (Moore et al., 
1989). 
The fifth and final method, the IPO, happens when a private firm choose to list publicly in the form of an MLP.  
2.3   How is a Master Limited Partnership Valued? 
On a general note, the valuation of an MLP is no different from that of a corporation. At the most basic level, the 
present fair value of an MLP should reflect the value of future expected cash flows to the investor, discounted for 
market risk and the time value of money. But, as for most asset classes, a specific set of MLP valuation methods and 
metrics have developed amongst practitioners. In order to illustrate what investors generally look for, some of these 
25 
 
valuation principles and metrics are provided in the following. A full assessment of valuation techniques is outside 
the scope of this paper, however.  
2.3.1   Distribution Yield 
Historically, the MLP has been associated with fixed income and other yield investments. Specifically, 10-year U.S. 
Treasury Notes yield was long used as a benchmark for MLP yields, exhibiting a 52-week rolling correlation in the 
range between 10 and 30 per cent in “normal” periods (Morgan Stanley, 2011). Following the financial crisis and 
resulting QE rounds however, correlations are now in the negative, mostly due to the FED’s persistence in holding 
interest rates low. Increasingly, MLPs are being viewed more as a total return vehicle, although investors still do 
look at yield metrics in assessing relative value.  
When comparing yields, the most commonly used metric is the current yield. Current yield is calculated by dividing 
the most recent annualised distribution by current price18. The metric does provide some relative insight, but by and 
large ignores fundamental value drivers for the MLP. For example, a higher relative yield can result from the MLP 
having a riskier profile, with more volatile cash flows or higher leverage. A relatively lower yield on the other hand, 
can result from the MLP having ex ante higher growth prospects, which may be reflected in a relatively higher unit 
price. Essentially, investors need to look at the MLP as a total return vehicle, and take into consideration other 
factors that drive both cash flow yield and unit price appreciation to arrive at a sound assessment. 
2.3.2   Two-Stage Dividend Discount Model 
One frequently used method that does take into account the total return feature of MLPs is the Two-Stage 
Distribution Discount Model (“DDM”) (Morgan Stanley, 2011; Wachovia, 2008; Wells Fargo Securities, 2010). The 
model calculates the present value of expected future distributions made to investors, using expected distribution per 
unit, the cost of equity and expected growth rate as input. As a proxy for expected distributions, it is common 
practice to use “distributable cash flow” divided by the number of units outstanding. For MLP IPOs, this figure is 
provided in the IPO prospectus (pro forma unaudited). For seasoned MLPs, cash available for distribution can be 
calculated as shown in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
18 Some practitioners also use the forward yield for relative valuation assessment. The forward yield is calculated by taking the expected 
distributions to be paid within a financial year and divide by current price. 
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Table 3. Calculating Distributable Cash Flow 
Net income   EBITDA 
+ Depreciation and amortisation   - Interest expense 
- Maintenance capital expenditures OR - Maintenance capital expenditure 
= Available cash flow   = Available cash flow 
- Cash to the general partner   - Cash to the general partner 
= Distributable cash flow   = Distributable cash flow 
 
There are many versions of the DDM; here, “two-stage” refers to the model taking into account two different growth 
rate periods. 
   ∑
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Where: 
      Expected distribution per unit; 
    Cost of equity (hg = High growth period, sg = Stable growth period); 
    Terminal value at the end of year n; 
    Perpetual growth rate after year n 
The DDM is equivalent to the Dividend Discount Model, which will be familiar to most finance students and 
practitioners19. The component that differs from common practice however, is the cost of equity, ke.  Despite certain 
model limitations, the cost of equity in finance literature is often derived using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(“CAPM”), where the cost of equity is found by performing the following calculation: 
                      
Where: 
    Cost of equity; 
    Risk free rate; 
   Beta of the underlying security (systematic risk); 
    Market premium 
                                                             
19 For an introduction to the Dividend Discount Model, see for example Damodaran’s chapter on the subject, available from 
[http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pdfiles/valn2ed/ch13.pdf] 
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For MLPs however, this method is not considered optimal (Morgan Stanley, 2011; Wells Fargo Securities, 2010). 
MLP returns have historically not exhibited high correlations with the stock markets20, thus having very low beta 
values. Since a major feature of the CAPM is to determine cost of capital based on how the price of the underlying 
security moves with the marked, this lacking market correlation makes the use of the CAPM less meaningful. This is 
especially true since the CAPM does not capture the cost of GP equity, hence often understating the cost of equity 
capital to the MLP. What is normally used instead of the CAPM is some metric conveying the required rate of return 
for investors. For LP equity, the required rate of return can be approximated by the forward yield plus expected 
distribution growth. For the GP equity, the calculation is similar, but needs to take into account any IDRs attributable 
to the GP following distribution growth. The weighted average cost of equity will increase as distributions are grown 
to levels where IDRs are triggered. 
In deriving the required rate of return, there are two main areas to consider, namely (1) cash flow volatility and (2) 
cash flow sustainability. Volatility refers to the fluctuation in operating cash flows, which will vary depending on the 
underlying assets and business model. For example, MLPs such as propane and heating oil distributors are exposed 
to seasonality in sales, thus exhibiting high cash flow volatility on a quarterly basis. Sustainability of cash flows 
refers to the impact from the regulatory environment in which the MLP operates. For example, pipeline MLPs have 
highly regulated business models, with prices and tariffs set by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”), and with flow-through volumes contracted ahead of time. In addition to barriers to entry in the industry, 
these characteristics are indicative of cash flow sustainability.  
In general, the cheapest financing for MLPs is likely debt, followed by LP equity and GP equity. Creditors receive 
interest payments before investors receive distributions, and should hence require a lower rate of return. Due to MLP 
governance characteristics and distribution payments however, MLPs are considered more risky by rating agencies 
(Moody’s Investors Services, 2007), receiving sub-investment grade ratings. This can potentially make debt more 
expensive than for similarly situated corporations. If the cost of equity then does not take distribution growth and 
IDRs into consideration, the resulting cost of equity might be lower than the cost of debt.  
2.3.3   Net Asset Value 
For a more comprehensive analysis of the underlying assets of an MLP, the investor can also perform a Net Asset 
Value (“NAV”) calculation. The NAV calculation is useful in combination with the DDM, as it may reveal structural 
                                                             
20 As measured by the Alerian MLP Index (AMZ), MLPs have historically exhibited a 47 per cent correlation with the S&P 500, and had a 
61 per cent correlation with the S&P 500 for 2012 (as of 05.11.2012). In general, MLPs have followed markets in times of severe stress, 
while correlations have fallen during normal times. During the financial crisis, when raising capital became more difficult, the valuation of 
the entire MLP asset class fell along with the market. At the height of the crisis however, it became evident that most MLPs sustained their 
distributions, sending the Alerian MLP Index up 76 per cent in 2009 (Rusoff, 2012). SteelPath Fund Advisors (2011) also notes that in 
August 2004, when equity markets hit rock bottom that year, investors were concerned about the general economic outlook, resulting in a 90 
per cent correlation between MLPs and the S&P 500.  
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problems not accounted for in the DDM. The DDM favours MLPs that pay out the largest share of cash flows 
regardless of whether such payments are appropriate in the current business environment. Conversely, a NAV 
calculation needs to follow a bottom-up approach, and take into account specific risks associated with different 
segments or assets within the MLP. On an aggregate level, NAV is defined as the value of an entity’s assets, less any 
intangible assets and liabilities. 
2.3.4   Distribution Coverage Ratio 
A common valuation metric in the MLP space is the Distribution Coverage Ratio (“DCR”), defined as the ratio of 
available cash for distribution to distributions paid to the GP and LP.  
    
                                     
                          
        
The ratio is essentially a liquidity measure, and can be compared to the Interest Coverage Ratio used by banks to 
assess a company’s ability to meet interest payments. In general, MLPs will target certain DCR levels based on the 
nature of the underlying assets and cash flow volatility. It is normal to see for example propane producers targeting 
DCRs at 1.1x, while pipeline MLPs will target DCRs in the range between 1.0x to 1.1x. A higher the ratio increases 
the likelihood of the MLP meeting its target distributions, and also gives management more flexibility in raising 
distributions. 
2.3.5   Multiples 
Multiples in various forms are commonly used for valuation sanity checks. Two multiples relevant for the MLP asset 
class are Price-To-Distributable Cash Flow (“P/DCF”) and Enterprise Value-To-Adjusted EBITDA 
(“EV/EBITDA”).  
P/DCF is comparable to the more common Price-To-Earnings (“PE”) ratio. Distributable cash flow is more relevant 
for MLP valuation than net income, and hence the PE ratio is not as frequently used. The ratio is useful for assessing 
relative valuations within the MLP space.  According to Morgan Stanley (2011), MLPs have historically traded at an 
average 13.0x P/DCF multiple. 
EV/EBITDA is useful for evaluating an MLP’s value compared to non-MLP traded companies. In doing so however, 
it is important to adjust for the GP’s interest in the EBITDA, in order to compare “apples to apples”. EBITDA is 
used to support distributions paid to LPs and the GP, while enterprise value only reflects the value to LPs. Adjusting 
the EBITDA can be done simply by deducting the relevant percentage of EBITDA (accounting for IDRs) 
attributable to the GP (Wells Fargo Securities, 2010).  
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In many investment commentaries, it is stated that MLPs trade at more attractive valuations than regular 
corporations. In the below figure, 2011 multiples are shown for some MLPs, matched against associated corporate 
parents. MLPs trade at a median 12.6x EV/EBITDA multiple versus a median 7.0x for matched corporations. While 
it is not guaranteed that an MLP will achieve a more attractive valuation, this is what is generally observed in the 
market. According to Morgan Stanley (2011), MLPs have historically traded at an average 10.8x EV/EBITDA 
multiple. 
Figure 3. Valuation Differences between MLPs and Related Corporations21 
 
 
2.4   Historical Changes in the Regulatory and Business Environment of Master Limited Partnerships 
The MLP has existed as an alternative business model in the U.S. since the early 1980s. Due to its unique 
characteristics, the MLP became quite popular in the 1980s. From Apache Petroleum Company established the first 
MLP in 1981 and until the number of operating MLPs peaked in 1987, 105 firms had adopted the structure (132 
including financial MLPs). At that time, the asset class comprised firms from a wide variety of industries, including 
firms operating restaurants and hotels, oil and gas producers, real estate developers, and even a commercial sports 
firm, the Boston Celtics. Smith and Brewerton (1988) and Bullard et al (1990) note that during the 1980s, the MLP 
was popular in industries with few growth opportunities, and for firms with assets creating large cash flows available 
for distribution. Ciccotello and Muscarella (2000) examine a sample of 119 MLP IPOs from 1981 to 1995, and find 
that the median average sales growth over the four first years of operations was in fact only 1.3 per cent for sample 
firms, versus an industry median at 2.2 per cent. In comparison, firms in the S&P 500 Index experienced a median 
annual sales growth at 8.8 per cent from 1986 to 1990.  
                                                             
21The blue bars represent MLPs, and the grey bars corporations. Sources: FactSet, Wells Fargo Securities estimates. 
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Compared to today, many of these early MLPs were more cyclical in nature. This is especially true for the oil and 
gas exploration and production (“E&P”) MLPs, which were more reliant on exploratory drilling to sustain cash 
flows, and to a lesser extent hedged commodity price exposure. As a result, E&P MLPs were severely hit during the 
commodity price collapse in the 1980s (Steelpath Fund Advisors, 2011). According to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (“EIA”), the price per barrel of imported crude oil in 1981 was on average USD 95.29. In 1986, the 
same commodity was priced at an average USD 29.45 per barrel and moved further down to an absolute low in 1998 
at USD 17.16 per barrel22. Not surprisingly, these early E&P MLPs quickly went bankrupt, were acquired or 
otherwise left the MLP space (see Figure 4) when prices plunged. The event left a foul taste in the mouth of 
investors, and shifted preferences towards assets in the more stable midstream space. 
Figure 4. Number of Operating MLPs by Year and Industry23 
 
Even though MLPs had existed in practice for half a decade, the structure was not officially “created” until the U.S. 
Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (“TRA 86”) and the Revenue Act of 1987 (“RA 87”).  
The TRA 86 established the structural scope of limited partnerships through prohibiting investors to use partnership 
losses to offset taxable income from other sources24. This effectively led to the fallout of partnerships that were not 
                                                             
22 Prices are given in real U.S. dollar terms, calculated based on the nominal price in the given year multiplied by the ratio of the 2012 
consumer price index divided by the consumer price index value for the given year. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(2012). Data spread sheet available for download from: [http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/realprices/].  
23 Sources: National Association for Publicly Traded Partnerships (“NAPTP”), own research 
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motivated by economic profitability, but merely established to function as tax shelters (SteelPath Fund Advisors, 
2011). At the same time, the TRA 86 lowered both the individual and corporate income tax rate, and moved the 
maximum individual tax rate (28 per cent) to a level below the top corporate tax rate (35 per cent). It further 
eliminated the preferential capital gains tax rate for corporate tax filers, leaving this benefit to individuals only. The 
passing of the TRA 86 hence increased the tax benefit of investing in limited partnerships, and pushed the MLP 
structure into a favourable position over the corporation from a tax perspective (Michaeley and Shaw, 1995). And, as 
can be observed in Figure 4, a large number of firms from a variety of industries moved into the asset class in the 
late 1980s. In particular during the years from 1985 to 1987, there was a substantial rise in the number of operating 
MLPs. The wave of corporate conversions into MLPs soon spurred concerns about the “disincorporation of 
America”, and a potential erosion of the corporate tax base (Jones et al., 2008). Not long after, the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987 was passed as part of the RA 87, establishing the operating scope of MLPs. The RA 87 
defined the term “publicly traded partnership” (“PTP”), and introduced the IRC Section 770425, listing the sources of 
qualifying income for MLPs. The legislation restricted partnership tax treatment to MLPs that derive a minimum 90 
per cent of revenue from certain energy related activities, including for example the exploration, development, 
mining or production, processing, refining, transportation, or marketing of any mineral or natural resource. As a 
result, non-qualifying MLPs were grandfathered, and the number of MLPs declined moving into the 1990s (Smith 
and Brewerton, 1988; Ciccotello and Muscarella, 2003). Increasingly, midstream oil and gas firms came to dominate 
the MLP space, with predictable cash flow businesses that both qualified for and suited the structure as it were. 
These MLPs primarily held assets that required little capital maintenance, produced stable cash flows, and had 
business models that had very limited exposure to commodity price fluctuations. It should also be noted that the 
downward trend in the number of operating MLPs coincided with the emergence of the “new economy” and the 
1990s internet boom. As the focus of the market shifted toward growth stories in the technology sphere, MLPs 
temporarily moved out of the limelight and received little attention from investors. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
24 The Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981 established a 15-year cost recovery period for real estate assets, which allowed for a widespread 
growth in real estate limited partnerships to function as tax shelters. Passive investors could depreciate highly leveraged real estate 
properties on their own hands, and use it to offset taxable income generated from other sources. The TRA Section 465 prohibited passive 
investors from offsetting other taxable income against costs related to debt unless they were personally liable for repayment. The TRA 
Section 469 further prohibited the use of partnership losses to offset income from other sources than income derived from the same 
partnerships.  
25 IRC Section 7704(c)(2) exempts publicly traded partnerships from entity level taxation, provided the entity derives a minimum 90 per 
cent of gross income from qualifying income sources, defined in Section 7704(d)(1). Qualifying income includes interests, dividends, real 
property rents, and income and gains derived from the exploration, development, mining or production, processing, refining, transportation 
(including pipelines transporting gas, oil or products thereof), or the marketing of any mineral or natural resource (including fertilizer, 
geothermal energy and timber), industrial source carbon dioxide, or the storage and transportation of certain alternative fuels. The Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) further releases Private Letter Rulings (“PLRs”) on a regular basis, clarifying the scope of qualifying income for 
MLPs. According to Goldman Sachs, the IRS has published 40 PLRs over the last 5 years, including the definition of income from 
cancellation of debt (“COD”) related to qualifying income producing assets as qualifying income. 
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Since 1987, legislation that has influenced the MLP space includes the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2003 (“JGTRRA 03”)26, the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (“TIPRA 05”)27, the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (“AJCA 04”)28, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA 
08”)29, and the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (“TRUIRJCA 
10”)30.  The JGTRRA 03 reduced the capital gains tax rate to 5 per cent for individuals in 10 and 15 per cent income 
tax brackets, and 15 per cent for individuals in higher income tax brackets. JGTRRA 03 also reduced the capital 
gains tax rate to zero for individuals in 10 and 15 per cent tax brackets for post-2007 tax years. This 0/15 per cent 
policy was extended into 2010 through the TIPRA 05, and later through 2012 by the TRUIRJCA 10. The legislation 
has maintained income and capital gains tax at lower levels than those experienced by investors in 1987, and 
maintained the attractiveness of partnership investments (Jones et al., 2008) from a tax perspective. 
The AJCA 04 expanded the investment scope of RICs, such as mutual funds, through modifying the IRC Section 
851. Prior to the AJCA 04, RICs were limited in their ability to invest in MLPs, as income derived from MLPs was 
considered UBTI. RICs can only receive 10 per cent of income from UBTI sources in order to maintain its RIC tax 
status. With the AJCA 04, income from MLPs was no longer considered UBTI, and RICs were able to increase the 
amount of income received from MLPs, subject to certain ownership limitations. Under the new rules, RICs can now 
hold MLP investments amounting to 25 per cent of total assets, as long as the ownership share in any one MLP does 
not exceed 10 per cent. The AJCA 04 thus introduced more meaningful institutional financing opportunities to 
existing and prospective MLPs. Moreover, the AJCA 04 sparked what was to become a move in the investor 
structure of MLPs from predominantly retail investors into a more mixed pool of investors. 
Figure 5. Institutional Ownership Trend from 2000 to 3Q 201231 
 
                                                             
26 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Public Law 108-127. 
27 Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005; Public Law 109-222. 
28 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004; Public Law108-357. 
29 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008; Public Law 110-343. 
30 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010; Public Law 111-312. 
31 Sources: Thomson Reuters, Morgan Stanley Research 
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As displayed in Figure 5, institutional ownership has increased from approximately 10 to 32 per cent from 2004 to 
3Q 2012. The implications for MLPs from the AJCA 04 changes have thus been noticeable shift in investor mix, 
albeit not overwhelming. According to Morgan Stanley, 23 midstream closed-end funds have listed from 2004 to 3Q 
2012, managing funds with a total net asset value at USD 28.426 billion. In addition, various MLP exchange traded 
notes and funds have become available to investors, with funds valued at approximately USD 12 billion listed since 
2009. Steelpath Fund Advisors (2011) point out that the reason why MLPs are not experiencing an even larger influx 
of institutional investors might be that there are still some practical hurdles related to tax reporting that make MLP 
investments less attractive compared to corporations. A second possible explanation is that historically, MLPs have 
not been on the radar for institutional investors, which in turn might have limited the number of expert analysts and 
portfolio managers who work with and understand the asset class. With increased focus on MLPs from mainstream 
Wall Street, it is likely that MLP products to a larger extent will be marketed, spurring continued growth in 
institutional ownership. Lastly, the EESA 08 slightly modified the operating scope of MLPs by expanding the 
definition of qualifying income. Specifically, the transportation of certain alternative fuels, such as ethanol, 
biodiesel, and industrial-source carbon dioxide were included under the qualifying income definition in the IRC 
Section 7704. During 2012, two bills have also been passed in Congress and the House of Representatives, arguing 
the case to expand the IRC Section 7704 even further, and accept renewable energy as a qualifying income source.  
It is likely that all of these regulatory changes have played a part in bringing the MLP asset class back into shape. It 
should be noted however, that the proliferation of the asset class also can be linked to growing energy production 
volumes observed in the U.S. The emergence of new extraction technology such as horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing has pushed volumes across the continent, with Texas and North Dakota seeing the strongest growth. 
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Figure 6. Relative Growth in Gross Production Volumes for Natural Resources in the United States from 2000 
to 201132 
 
As energy production volumes is an important driver for energy infrastructure demand, midstream MLPs have seen 
some very real growth opportunities materialise over the last decade. For example, the Interstate Natural Gas 
Association of America (“INGAA”) published a report in 2011 suggesting that in order to support growing supply of 
oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids (“NGLs”) from emerging shale plays, a total amount of USD 251.1 billion (in 
real 2010 dollars) will have to be invested in energy infrastructure moving from 2011 into 2035. Further, the U.S. 
Department of Energy (“DOE”) recently released its long anticipated liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) exports study. 
The report examines the overall impact on the U.S. economy from exporting natural gas, and also considers the 
impact on global natural gas prices. The report concluded that in all scenarios covered, LNG exports would have a 
net positive impact on the U.S. economy making LNG exports approval increasingly more likely (NERA Economic 
Consulting, 2012). According to Morgan Stanley, the DOE is currently reviewing 15 pending applications for LNG 
exports, including Kinder Morgan Inc. (“KMI”), which holds GP interest in the two MLPs Kinder Morgan Energy 
Partners LP (“KMP”) and El Paso Pipeline Partners LP (“EPB”). Other MLPs that have filed for LNG exports with 
the DOE include Energy Transfer Equity LP (“ETE”) and Energy Transfer Partners LP (“ETP”). If export is 
permitted, MLPs face growth opportunities both within LNG onshore transportation, storage, and maritime 
transportation.   
                                                             
32 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
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2.5   Recent Innovations in the Master Limited Partnership Structure 
The objective of this chapter is to explore the development of MLPs as an asset class moving into the 21st century, 
and to detect how asset owners can tweak the MLP structure to allow for unconventional assets to enter the MLP 
space. With regulatory and business environments encouraging scope expansion, it is the task of managers and 
underwriters to make unconventional assets attractive for investors in the MLP form. Concluding this chapter, I will 
first present data on recent MLP IPOs, and proceed to present trending innovations in the MLP structure for recent 
listings of unconventional assets. Such innovations are primarily related to deviations from traditional MLP 
governance and tax treatment. 
2.5.1   Presentation of Data on Recent Issue Activity 
The data presented in the below tables have been extracted from the sample used to test underpricing in part two. For 
a thorough description of how data have been sampled, refer to the part two subchapter “Sample Description” on pp. 
59-62.  
Table 4. Sample MLP IPOs by Asset Category33 
IPO Year Coal Downstream Maritime Midstream Other minerals Upstream Total 
1994   1         1 
1996   2   2     4 
1998       2     2 
1999 1     1     2 
2000       1     1 
2001 1 1   2     4 
2002 1   1 4     6 
2004     2 3     5 
2005   3 1 5     9 
2006 2 1 1 8   6 18 
2007     3 7   4 14 
2008       2   1 3 
2010 2     3   1 6 
2011   2 1 5 2 3 13 
2012   5   5 1 1 12 
Total 7 15 9 50 3 16 100 
 
Table 4 illustrates how unconventional assets in the upstream and downstream segments have entered the MLP space 
over the last decade. Some maritime transporters, coal and other minerals producers have also launched IPOs, 
representing deviations to the traditional pattern of midstream IPOs. For a closer look at recent IPO activity, more 
detailed information about recent listings is provided in Table 5.  
                                                             
33 Assets have been categorised according to Appendix 1. “Other Minerals” includes fertilizer and monocrystalline sand producers. 
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Compared to the previous popularity peak in the late 1980s, the MLP universe now exhibits a wider diversity in 
assets adopting the structure. The trend can be illustrated by looking at the assets listed in recent IPOs in Table 5. 
Coal producers such as Oxford Resource Partners LP and Rhino Resource Partners LP both launched their IPOs in 
2010, and in 2011, fertilizer producers CVR Partners LP and Rentech Nitrogen Partners LP followed suit. Like oil 
and gas producers, these firms are to a larger extent sensitive to fluctuations in commodity prices. Rentech Nitrogen 
Partners LP states in its IPO prospectus that “nitrogen fertilizer prices are, seasonal, cyclical and highly volatile (…) 
and could potentially expose us to significant fluctuations in our operating and financial results, and (…) our 
quarterly distributions”34. This differs substantially from the situation for midstream MLPs such as Access 
Midstream Partners LP (previously Chesapeake Midstream Partners LP), which owns and operates natural gas 
gathering systems focused on “cost-advantaged unconventional resource plays such as the Barnett Shale and the 
Colony Granite Wash and Texas Panhandle Granite Wash”35. Access Midstream Partners LP’s revenues are mostly 
derived from long-term, fixed-fee contracts, which makes the firm’s business model more traditional in the context 
of MLPs. The last three years also saw the re-entry of IPOs in the upstream segment, which is a segment 
characterised by more volatility in cash flows than the midstream behemoths that have historically dominated the 
MLP space. Compared to the early E&P MLPs in 1980s however, these new upstream MLPs own mostly mature 
longer-life reserves, and employ methods to lessen cash flow volatility. For example, it has become normal for E&P 
MLPs to hedge commodity price risks. Mid-Con Energy Partners LP state in their IPO prospectus that they “expect 
to enter into commodity derivative contracts at times and on terms designed to maintain, over the long-term, a 
portfolio covering approximately 50% to 80% of estimated oil production from proved reserves over a three-to-five 
year period at any given point of time”36. Lastly, another recent development has been the introduction of maritime 
transporters and offshore E&P and oil services firms, such as Golar LNG Partners LP and Seadrill Partners LLC.  
These firms own assets that are traditionally highly leveraged; sometimes ships or drilling rigs may be up to 70 per 
cent debt financed. As previously stated, MLPs are usually not as highly leveraged due to the GP unlimited liability 
factor, which might pose a challenge when structuring growth transactions in the maritime transportation segment. 
Considering the deviations from traditional MLP success criteria detected in the above examples, these new MLPs 
represent cases where certain innovations have likely been made to attract investor interest. In the following sub-
chapters, some observed trending innovations are discussed. 
                                                             
34 Rentech Nitrogen Partners LP IPO prospectus. Available from: [http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/filing.ashx?filingid=7856904] 
35 Chesapeake Midstream Partners LP IPO prospectus. Available from: 
[http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/filing.ashx?filingid=7051174#D424B4_HTM_ROM27184_4] 
36 Mid-Con Energy Partners LP IPO prospectus. Available from: 
[http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/filing.ashx?filingid=7923699#H83468B4E424B4_HTM_H83468105] 
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Table 5. Recent MLP IPOs Illustrating Market Acceptance of Unconventional Assets37 
IPO date Issuer Name 
Deal 
Value 
(USD 
million) 
Offer 
Price 
(USD) 
% Δ     
Offer/  
1 Day 
% Δ Offer/ 
Current 
Implied 
Yield at 
Offer 
Price 
Industry 
Segment 
Primary Assets/ 
Activity 
20.11.2012 Alon USA Partners LP 160 16 6.3 % 18.0 % - Downstream Refinery 
02.11.2012 Delek Logistics Partners LP 168 21 6.4 % 6.9 % 7.1 % Downstream 
Oil logistics and 
marketing 
02.11.2012 Southcross Energy Partners LP 180 20 11.8 % 17.4 % 8.0 % Midstream 
Pipelines, 
processing plants 
26.10.2012 MPLX LP 381 22 23.6 % 30.7 % 4.8 % Midstream 
Pipelines, 
storage 
25.10.2012 Lehigh Gas Partners LP 120 20 1.2 % -3.3 % 8.8 % Downstream 
Fuel wholesale 
distribution 
19.10.2012 Seadrill Partners LLC 193 22 7.6 % 19.4 % 7.0 % Upstream 
Offshore drilling 
rigs 
28.09.2012 Summit Midstream Partners 250 20 5.6 % -1.3 % 8.0 % Midstream Pipelines 
20.09.2012 Susser Petroleum Partners LP 195 20.5 11.8 % 21.8 % 8.5 % Downstream 
Fuel wholesale 
distribution 
16.08.2012 Hi-Crush Partners LP 191 17 17.6 % -9.2 % 11.2 % 
Minerals 
extraction 
Monocrystalline 
sand production 
26.07.2012 Northern Tier Energy LP 228 14 1.1 % 66.4 % - Downstream Refinery 
27.06.2012 EQT Midstream Partners, LP 263 21 13.1 % 46.3 % 6.7 % Midstream Pipelines 
04.05.2012 PetroLogistics LP 595 17 -2.9 % -31.1 % 11.9 % Downstream 
Petrochemicals 
production 
16.12.2011 Inergy Midstream LP 272 17 3.8 % 38.4 % 8.7 % Midstream 
Natural gas 
storage 
15.12.2011 Mid-Con Energy Partners LP 97 18 0.3 % 14.9 % 10.6 % Upstream 
Onshore oil and 
gas reserves 
09.12.2011 
Memorial Production Partners 
LP 
171 19 -1.1 % -1.9 % 10.0 % Upstream 
Onshore oil and 
gas reserves 
09.12.2011 Rose Rock Midstream LP 140 20 0.0 % 64.9 % 7.3 % Midtream 
Pipelines and 
storage 
11.11.2011 LRR Energy LP 179 19 0.3 % -2.5 % 10.0 % Upstream 
Onshore oil and 
gas reserves 
04.11.2011 Rentech Nitrogen Partners LP 300 20 -0.7 % 99.6 % - Fertilizer 
Fertilizer 
production 
27.07.2011 
American Midstream Partners 
LP 
79 21 -0.2 % -22.6 % 7.9 % Midstream 
Pipelines, 
processing plants 
14.07.2011 Oiltanking Partners LP 215 21.5 10.2 % 72.6 % 6.3 % Midstream 
Oil terminaling, 
storage, 
transportation 
15.06.2011 Compressco Partners LP 53 20 -5.0 % -13.4 % 7.8 % Midstream 
Natural gas 
compression 
                                                             
37 Sources: NAPTP, 424B filings sampled from the SEC’s Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (“EDGAR”) system, 
Bloomberg. For a thorough description of how data were sampled, see chapter 3.3.2 Sample Description on pp. 49-50. 
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12.05.2011 NGL Energy Partners LP 74 21 -0.1 % 7.6 % 6.4 % Downstream 
Propane 
distribution 
20.04.2011 Tesoro Logistics LP 273 21 11.9 % 119.5 % 6.4 % Midstream 
Oil logistics and 
marketing 
08.04.2011 CVR Partners LP 307 16 9.7 % 64.1 % - Fertilizer 
Fertilizer 
production 
08.04.2011 Golar LNG Partners LP 270 22.5 10.4 % 32.9 % 6.8 % Shipping LNG carriers 
16.12.2010 QR Energy LP 336 19.2 2.2 % -5.3 % 9.91 % Upstream 
Onshore oil and 
gas reserves 
29.09.2010 Rhino Resource Partners LP 65 20 9.5 % -31.1 % 8.90 % Coal Coal extraction 
29.07.2010 Access Midstream Partners LP 452 21 6.7 % 66.6 % 6.43 % Midstream Pipelines 
13.07.2010 Oxford Resource Partners LP 162 18.5 -2.9 % -69.1 % 9.46 % Coal Coal extraction 
12.05.2010 Niska Gas Storage Partners LLC 350 20 -4.5 % -44.0 % 8.05 % Midstream 
Natural gas 
storage 
30.04.2010 PAA Natural Gas Storage LP 252 21.5 8.1 % -13.3 % 6.28 % Midstream 
Natural gas 
storage 
 
Mean 225 20 5.2 % 18.1 % 8.1 % 
  
 
Median 195 20 5.6 % 14.9 % 8.0 % 
  
 
 
2.5.2   Innovations in Governance and the Partnership Agreement 
Board of Directors Increasingly Part of Governance Structure 
With regard to governance, the MLP has changed slightly over the years. Ciccotello and Muscarella (2000) state that 
within their sample of MLPs formed in the 1980s and 1990s, most MLPs have no board of directors. MLPs currently 
going to market increasingly include a board of directors to govern the GP’s activities. However, as noted by Moss 
(2007), the GP is still likely to retain control, as outside investors’ voting powers are limited with regard to the 
election of board members. In most MLPs, LPs are not entitled to vote for board members, and hence, the board 
functions more as a monitoring and advisory device for the Parent. Even in MLPs where LPs are granted to install a 
majority of board members, it is likely that due to investor dispersion, the candidates nominated by management are 
the ones to be elected. For example, Seadrill Partners LLC notes in its IPO prospectus that the “board will consist of 
seven members, three of whom will be appointed by the Seadrill Member in its sole discretion and four of whom will 
be elected by our common unitholders”38. Seemingly, outside investors are provided better governance in this 
situation, as they are able to install the majority of the board vote. However, it is not given that this theoretical 
                                                             
38 Seadrill Partners LLC IPO prospectus. Available from: 
[http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1553467/000119312512428803/d412047d424b4.htm] 
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benefit will translate into a real benefit for investors. Unless owners are block holders and have keen interest to 
monitor the MLP, the time and effort spent to track down and nominate suitable board members will likely be more 
costly than the expected gains from improved governance.  
Limited Liability Company Used as Alternative to the Master Limited Partnership 
A second development is the increase of Limited Liability Companies39 (“LLCs”) in the MLP space. An LLC can 
choose to be taxed either as a partnership or as a corporation, thus enjoying the same tax benefits as regular MLPs. 
The primary difference between the two structures is that an LLC does not have a GP or IDRs, but may have similar 
performance fees through what is termed Management Incentive Interests (“MIIs”). LLCs also provide unit holders 
with voting rights, subject to restrictions made in the Management Agreement (“MA”), which is similar to the PA. 
Table 6. Comparison of the MLP, LLC, and Corporation Structures40 
 
MLP LLC Corp 
Entity level taxation No No Yes 
Tax deferral on distributions Yes Yes No 
Tax reporting K-1 K-1 DIV-1099 
General partner Yes No No 
Incentive distribution rights Yes No No 
Management incentive interests No Yes No 
Investor voting rights No Yes Yes 
Limited liability Yes Yes Yes 
    
Of recent MLP IPOs, two firms have chosen to be structured as LLCs rather than partnerships, namely Seadrill 
Partners LLC and Niska Gas Storage Partners LLC. While Niska Gas Storage Partners LLC is structured more or 
less like an MLP, with limited voting rights and IDRs, Seadrill Partners LLC permits all members to vote. However, 
as stated in the IPO prospectus, “if at any time, any person or group owns beneficially more than 5% of any class of 
units then outstanding, any such units owned by that person or group in excess of 5% may not be voted on any 
matter”38. In general, structuring the firm as an LLC may give investors increased governance power, which can be 
relevant for firms with unconventional assets. However, as in the case of Seadrill Partners LLC, the firm is still able 
to limit investors’ governance power through the MA.  
Variable Distribution Policy 
The third trend observed in recent IPOs is the movement away from traditional distribution policies. For example, 
Northern Tier Energy Partners LP and Alon USA Partners LP both abandoned traditional distribution policies and 
instead embraced floating distribution policies when launching their IPOs in 2012. Both MLPs are focused in the 
                                                             
39 As of 10.12.2012, Atlas Energy Resources, Constellation Energy Partners, Copano Energy, Linn Energy, NuStar GP Holdings, Niska Gas 
Storage Partners, Vanguard Natural Resources, and Seadrill Partners are registered as LLCs. 
40 Wachovia (2008) 
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downstream segment, and have clear ambitions to pursue growth opportunities either through organic growth or 
acquisitions41. For example, Alon USA Partners LP state in its IPO prospectus that “The amount of our quarterly 
cash distributions, if any, will vary significantly both quarterly and annually and will be directly dependent on the 
performance of our business. Unlike most publicly traded partnerships, we will not have a minimum quarterly 
distribution or employ structures intended to consistently maintain or increase distributions over time”. Both 
Northern Tier Energy Partners LP and Alon USA Partners LP own and operate crude refining facilities. Refining is 
essentially a margin-based business, with profitability depending on the prices of both feedstock (primarily crude oil) 
and the higher value finished products. Further, Alon USA Partners LP states that part of its business strategy is to 
“enhance existing operations and invest in organic growth” and that it also “may pursue accretive acquisitions 
within (…) refining and wholesale marketing business operations”. Clearly, these are companies with potentially 
volatile cash flows and growth ambitions. Allowing for flexibility in cash flow management is a way to avoid 
defaulting on promised distribution payments to investors, while still allowing investors to partake in upside 
situations. Essentially, these MLPs go to market perhaps not on the grounds of being a traditional MLP, but on being 
a firm in the downstream segment committed to distribute cash to investors whenever it is appropriate. Further, they 
are structured for growth, rather than as steady yield vehicles. The two fertilizer producers Rentech Nitrogen 
Partners LP and CVR Partners LP are also examples of new MLPs that have chosen to adopt variable distribution 
policies. Similar to the downstream MLPs, these firms have highly cyclical business models, and prefer to let 
distribution levels flow with cash flow variability. 
Reduced Top-Tier Splits in Incentive Distribution Rights 
Some MLPs have reduced the maximum split for IDRs, which may give more room for growth through lessening the 
burden on cost of capital as distributions increase. For example, in 2002, Enterprise Products Partners reduced its 
IDR top-tier split from 50 per cent to 25 per cent in order to reduce its cost of equity. Other MLPs that have taken 
steps to reduce or eliminate IDRs include NuStar LP, Mark West Energy Partners LP, Suburban Propane Partners 
LP, Sunoco Logistics Partners LP, and TC PipeLines LP (Wells Fargo Securities, 2010). Memorial Production 
Partners LP and LRR Energy LP launched their IPOs with lower top-tier IDR splits, at 25 and 23.1 per cent 
respectively. Memorial Production Partners LP is a growth oriented upstream MLP, which has clear ambitions to use 
its cost of capital advantage to pursue acquisitions competitively: “Unlike our corporate competitors, we do not 
expect to be subject to federal income taxation at the entity level. We believe that this attribute should provide us 
with a lower cost of capital compared to many of our competitors, thereby enhancing our ability to compete for 
future acquisitions”. By avoiding higher IDR splits, Memorial Production Partners LP will be able to maintain a 
                                                             
41Northern Tier Energy Partners LP IPO prospectus. Available from: [http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.p9NK5.htm#u7h]; 
Alon USA Partners LP IPO prosctus. Available from: 
[http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1556766/000119312512478964/d400066d424b4.htm]. 
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reasonable cost of capital, and be able to compete for new properties to sustain reserve levels in the future. The MLP 
has also included provisions in its PA that allows the GP to amend IDR levels without the approval of LPs. For 
investors, such provisions signal that the upstream MLP has ambitions beyond exploiting current reserves, and that 
the MLP may be suitable for long-term investments. 
No Incentive Distribution Rights 
Over the last two years, 6 MLPs have gone public with no IDRs, including Alon USA Partners LP, Mid Con Energy 
Partners LP, Rentech Nitrogen Partners LP, CVR Partners LP, Northern Tier Energy LP, and PetroLogistics LP. The 
common denominator for the above MLPs is that all firms are involved in cyclical industries, where operating 
income is subject to commodity price variations. By excluding IDRs, these MLPs signal to investors that any 
abnormal positive cash flows are to be distributed on a pro-rata basis. This might function as a sweetener for 
investors when assuming ownership of assets producing more volatile cash flows.  
2.5.3   Innovations in Tax Treatment 
Corporate Tax Treatment Election 
As some non-U.S. based corporates have chosen to list assets in the U.S. using the MLP structure, more MLPs now 
choose to be treated as corporations for tax purposes. Recently formed MLPs that have chosen to be taxed as 
corporations include Golar LNG Partners LP, and Seadrill Partners LLC. Others include Capital Products Partners 
LP, Navios Maritime Partners LP, and Teekay Offshore Partners LP. By not being taxed as partnerships, the MLPs 
forego tax advantages, but avoid the administrative burden related to tax reporting. For MLPs without material 
business in the U.S., the cost-benefit calculation does not favour partnership election, making investors better off 
when the MLP is taxed as a corporation. Being taxed as a corporation also makes it easier for non-U.S. retail 
investors and institutional investors to own units. This can benefit an MLP seeking a specific investor mix, or gain 
sufficient interest if it is a large issue.  
Intuitively, the choice of some MLPs to be taxed as corporations validates that there are other benefits to the MLP 
structure than favourable tax treatment. As previously stated, the structure can function as an innovating financing 
method for the Parent, allowing for the sale of equity without losing control over the assets. The MLP provides an 
opportunity to realise part of asset financing at an attractive valuation, and in addition receive cash from quarterly 
distributions through retained LP shares.  
2.6   Concluding Remarks  
Having explored the development of the MLP structure, it is challenging to conclude whether it is true or not that 
“investors are less concerned” with what types of assets are contained within the MLP than they have been in the 
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past. What is certain however is that owners of assets with the help of underwriters have become aware of how the 
MLP can be tweaked to function well also for unconventional assets. A second conclusion that can be drawn is that 
there has been a shift towards more growth oriented platforms during the last decade, perhaps motivated by the 
energy renaissance experienced in the U.S., and investors’ move towards valuing MLPs as total return vehicles.  
Increasingly, MLPs are becoming less of an asset class per se, with deviations from the norm appearing quite 
frequently. Still, similarities persist, and MLPs will likely be marketed to investors along the storyline of stable yield 
and tax deferred cash flows for some time to come. “If it looks like an MLP, and smells like an MLP”… surely it 
must be an MLP. 
3   Underpricing of Master Limited Partnership Initial Public Offerings 
As illustrated by the qualitative assessment made in the chapter two, it is evident that the MLP space has changed 
considerably since the 1980s. It is then interesting to examine whether the academic research results tracking early 
MLPs still hold when the same tests are employed using new data. In this chapter, I will address parts of early 
research, and explore the phenomenon of IPO underpricing in the context of MLPs.  
Underpricing has been a popular research topic since it was first recorded during the 1970s. For the purpose of 
understanding the underpricing phenomenon, this chapter first presents a brief introduction to IPOs. Information 
about the benefits and disadvantages of being publicly listed, as well as the IPO process, is presented from the 
perspective of an MLP. Subsequently, I will move on to explain what is generally meant by the term underpricing, 
before presenting empirical observations across time and geographies. Despite underpricing being regarded as a 
more or less ubiquitous phenomenon, no one theory has succeeded in explaining why underpricing exists. Inspired 
by the categorisations in Ljungqvist (2004) and Ritter and Welch (2002), I present existing and tested theories to 
establish a foundation for further analysis. In line with the objective of this paper, hypotheses focusing on 
asymmetric information are given the most attention. At the end of this chapter, I present an empirical analysis on 
the underpricing of MLPs, where I motivate my hypothesis based on established theory and previous empirical 
research. 
3.1   What is an Initial Public Offering? 
An IPO is the process where a company lists its equity for public trading on an exchange, and there has been no prior 
market for the company’s equity. Concomitant to the listing, the company will execute a transaction where either 
newly issued (“primary”) or existing (“secondary”) equity is sold to the public in the exchange for cash. There are 
also alternative ways to execute an IPO besides a public cash offering, such as allocating equity to pre-selected 
investors through a private placement. 
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The number of IPOs is known to vary over time. For MLPs, a large number of firms went public in the late 1980s. In 
the 1990s, the asset class experienced a substantial drop in IPO activity, but picked up again following the internet 
bubble crash. In 2006, 18 MLPs came into existence, representing a local peak for the 2000s. Similar to other asset 
classes, the years following the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 saw meagre IPO activity. Coinciding with post-
crisis low fixed income yields, an increasing number of MLPs have launched their IPOs moving into 2012.  
Figure 7. Number of Operating MLP IPOs by Year42 
 
As for MLPs, the number of firms going public is known to vary substantially across time periods. As a result, a lot 
of effort both on theoretical and empirical grounds has been made to better understand the going-public decision 
process. Theories roughly categorise the going-public decision as motivated either by the life cycle of a firm, or by 
market timing.  For example, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) argue that in the early phase in the life of a firm, the 
cost burden of going public will be higher than the valuation accretion from the benefits of being publicly listed. 
Hence, the authors suggest that early in its life cycle, the firm will be private, but as it grows increasingly large, it 
will become attractive to go public. Market timing models posit that the entrepreneur will await bull markets’ 
favourable pricing, or wait until real growth opportunities are reflected by valuations before going public (see for 
example Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999; Schultz, 2000). On a more practical note, 
underwriters may also influence entrepreneurs in their decision to proceed with an IPO. Underwriters can gauge 
market sentiment by observing how attempted IPOs are absorbed in the market, and advise entrepreneurs to launch 
when valuations are relatively higher. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002b) provide some insight to this hypothesis, and 
present data that show a 38 per cent withdrawal rate for NASDAQ IPOs in 2000. This higher-than-usual withdrawal 
rate coincided with the lowest return recorded over 30 years for the NASDAQ Composite Index.  
                                                             
42 Sources: NAPTP, own research. 
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In practice, the decision is probably coloured by several perspectives. In order to compare theory with practice, Brau 
and Fawcett (2006)  survey 336 chief financial officers (“CFOs”) in the U.S., covering topics such as the motivations 
for going public, timing of the IPO, and other issues related to the IPO process. With Brau and Fawcett’s (2006) 
conclusions as a foundation for discussion, a generic presentation of benefits and disadvantages of public listing in 
the context of MLPs is provided in the following. 
3.1.1   Benefits of Public Listing 
Access to Capital Markets 
In general, public listing makes it easier for the firm to access both debt and equity capital markets to raise financing. 
In addition to the equity proceeds received from the IPO, the firm will have the opportunity to tap equity markets 
through seasoned equity offerings in the future, and then likely at a lower cost than at the IPO. Companies that go 
public also have a tendency to reduce their cost of credit (Pagano et al., 1998), perhaps due to increased negotiation 
power with banks. Being publicly listed also makes it more feasible to use equity as a form of payment in 
transactions. As noted in Pagano et al. (1998), access to capital markets is highly important for companies that have 
high leverage, and that face investment needs with regard to growth opportunities. In Brau and Fawcett, CFOs lists 
the need for capital to support growth as the third most influential factor for timing IPOs. For MLPs, access to 
capital markets is critical, as it represents the primary source of funding for new capital investments. Most MLPs pay 
out all available cash at a quarterly basis, and only retain a minor share for working capital requirements and 
maintenance capital expenditures. In order to grow distributions, many MLPs seek to grow either through organic 
growth or acquisitions, and need to finance this growth either through bonds, bank debt or equity issuance.  
Liquidity in Equity Interests and Exit for Early Investors 
Listing at an exchange facilitates the matching of potential sellers and buyers of the firm’s equity interests through 
the organised securities market. By being publicly listed, the MLP makes it both easier and less costly for investors 
to trade, resulting in better liquidity in the MLP’s units. Increased liquidity also makes it easier for venture investors 
or entrepreneurs to realise part of their wealth, or to exit the investment completely.  
Transparency 
Upon the public listing of an MLP, it is legally required that the firm publishes any information relevant for the unit 
price. Information transparency is required by the exchange in order to reduce information heterogeneity between 
market participants. If investors receive the same information about the MLPs operations, it is more likely that the 
valuation realised in the market is correct. In general, but also for MLPs in particular, information requirements can 
function as a disciplining mechanism for management. The GP in an MLP often retains a sizeable stake of the LP 
equity, and is entitled to IDRs. If the GP makes poor decisions on behalf of the MLP which is required to be 
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published, the unit price may depreciate and reduce the wealth of the GP. In the event individual managers 
personally are holding equity or receive options or units as part of their compensation, the disciplining mechanism 
becomes even stronger. 
Hostile Takeover Defence 
In some situations, a firm can be under the threat of a hostile takeover from investors that deem the company 
underpriced. One possible way to realise the fair underlying value of the company’s equity, is to list the firm for 
public trading, achieve the “right” valuation, and hence let the market mitigate the takeover. In the context of MLPs, 
this situation is relevant in particular for corporates that hold a variety of assets, with certain “bad” assets depressing 
the value of the entire firm. In order to mitigate a takeover, the corporation can execute a dropdown of either high or 
poorly performing assets into an MLP, and thus realise a higher value for the “crown jewels” and for the corporation 
in its entirety. By retaining part of the LP units in the new MLP, the corporate parent will still receive cash flows 
from the assets through distributions, and may have efficiently blocked a takeover from outside investors.  
Realising Higher Valuations in Bull Markets 
Zingales (1995) observed that entrepreneurs might be motivated to go public by the prospect of realising a higher 
exit valuation for their ownership shares. A public firm is more likely to attract the attention of potential acquirers, 
and less likely to be pressured on price, as outside investors are harder to negotiate terms with. A follow-up to 
Zingales is provided by Black and Gilson (1998), who examines a sample of venture-capital-backed IPOs. They note 
that high entrepreneur retention rates indicate that the IPO is more of an exit opportunity for venture capitalists rather 
than entrepreneur exit. This strand of theory is substantiated by CFO answers in Brau and Fawcett (2006), which 
lists overall stock market conditions as the most important IPO timing factor. The second most important reason 
listed is industry conditions. When the stock market and industry conditions are favourable, valuations are likely to 
be higher on average. Higher valuation not only gives existing investors an opportunity to realise higher returns, but 
also increases the amount of proceeds received by the firm from the IPO. For MLPs, many firms came to market 
coinciding with increasing energy production volumes through the 2000s. In particular, the present value of future 
growth opportunities for the midstream segment increased during this period (Interstate Natural Gas Association of 
America, 2011), which may have led to higher valuations for the industry in the market. 
3.1.2   Disadvantages of Public Listing 
Information Transparency Requirements 
Just like transparency can benefit the firm, it can also pose a disadvantage. When an event detrimental to the value of 
the company takes place, information about the event is required to be published. In some situations, this may 
substantially depreciate the value of equity interests. Information that is harmful to the reputation of the firm may 
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even affect long term pricing, and lead to other indirect costs through for example less liquidity in the firm’s equity. 
Further, information requirements may reduce the competitiveness of a firm if information regarding the company’s 
operations is required to be published. The SEC imposes strict disclosure requirements with regard to information 
reporting for public companies, and the running administrative cost related to such requirements might be taxing. 
Like corporations, an MLP is for example required to file 10-Q and 10-K forms with the SEC on a quarterly and 
annual continual basis respectively. Given that favourable information may positively affect unit prices, information 
transparency requirements could potentially also shift management’s focus from long-term goals to short-term 
performance.  
Reduced Control  
In an IPO, the entrepreneur may sell down to realise wealth. As a result, outside investors will gain more power over 
how the business is run. For MLPs, this specific disadvantage is avoided through the PA. The PA specifically 
assigns control rights over the MLP’s assets to the GP, and can enhance control through provisions regarding the 
removal of the GP. In most cases, the GP can only be removed by supermajority in the vote of LPs (66.7 per cent). 
Considering that recent MLP IPOs have issued less than 66.7 per cent of LP units to outside investors, the loss of 
control is substantially mitigated in the case of MLPs. 
Tax Reporting and Other Administrative Costs 
The major disadvantage for MLPs in being publicly listed is the increased cost burden from administrative 
requirements. With regard to tax reporting, the MLP must supply outside investors with annual Schedule K-1 forms. 
If the MLP has chosen Section 754 election, it also needs to keep track of all trading in its units, and make regular 
adjustments to match the outside and inside basis of the MLP. 
Direct Costs Related to the Initial Public Offering 
The process of going public is costly.  For an MLP as for a corporation, the firm will have to engage both an auditor, 
legal counsel, and one or more underwriters to help prepare and execute the IPO. For MLPs, The SEC imposes 
stringent disclosure requirements with regard to the IPO prospectus43. An important part of the preparation phase is 
due diligence of the firm’s assets and liabilities. In cooperation with auditors, management is required to prepare 
both predecessor historical financial statements, and pro-forma financial statements for the new entity. For a firm 
which has previously not prepared detailed financial statements, this process can be time consuming. Lee et al. 
(1996) reports that as a share of total proceeds, direct costs related to the IPO amount to 11 per cent. Of this, 
approximately 7 per cent is paid to the underwriter in the form of fees and commissions. Other costs that accrue from 
an IPO include fees payable to the exchange for listing, and future payments to remain listed.  
                                                             
43 For detailed information about financial statement disclosure requirements, see Earnst&Young (2011).  
47 
 
Indirect Costs Related to the Initial Public Offering 
Underpricing can be considered an indirect cost related to the IPO. Underpricing is commonly defined as the positive 
differential between the first-day closing price and the offer price, multiplied by the number of units issued at the 
IPO. The amount of proceeds foregone is sometimes termed “money left on the table”, and can be regarded as 
transfer of wealth from existing owners to new investors. The level of underpricing can be quite substantial, and 
even push indirect costs higher than the direct costs related to the IPO.  
3.1.3   The Initial Public Offering Process 
The IPO process for an MLP is quite complex. The IPO process is relevant for the underpricing phenomenon 
because it relates to how the pricing decision is made. In the following, I will hence focus on describing the general 
process and dynamics between the different consortium parties in the IPO process, rather than legal and reporting 
issues. 
The IPO process generally consists of four different phases: the advisory, preparatory, marketing, and aftermarket 
phase. Arguably, there are different ways to categorise the phases of an IPO process. The one I use is based on my 
own experience working with and talking to practitioners.  
The Advisory Phase 
In the advisory phase, the issuer approaches (or is approached by) an underwriter to discuss a potential listing of the 
company’s equity. For MLPs, the underwriter is typically a large bank that has analyst coverage on the segment, 
transaction expertise and a wide marketing reach. For example, Citigroup has functioned as one of the lead 
underwriters for 13 out of 26 of MLP IPOs the last two years. Other large banks that have functioned as lead 
underwriters are Morgan Stanley (10), Credit Suisse (6) and Goldman Sachs (5)44. As MLP IPOs tend to be large in 
size, the issuer often has several banks involved in underwriring the issue. If the issuer decides to move forward with 
the listing process after preliminary discussions, an auditor and legal counsel will also be hired to help facilitate the 
preparation of materials. The lead underwriter will coordinate the consortium on behalf of the issuer, and establish a 
timeline for the transaction. After the underwriter has processed financial data provided by the issuer (such as 
financial statements and past and future capital expenditure requirements), the parties will go into discussions about 
how much equity should be issued, how the transaction should be carried out, and in what price range the units 
should be traded in.  
The Preparatory Phase 
In the preparatory phase the underwriter initiates contact with the SEC and the relevant stock exchange to file for 
registration. Filing for registration through the SEC is a time consuming process, and according to Citigroup, due 
                                                             
44 Based on underwriter information listed in company prospectuses from sample described in chapter 3.3.2. 
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diligence to prepare the registration statement can take months. For MLPs, the two major stock exchanges are NYSE 
and NASDAQ. Choosing which stock exchange to list on is a function of many considerations, including trading 
liquidity, market for comparable MLPs and listing fees. Parallel to the listing process, the issuer will continue due 
diligence work in cooperation with the consortium to uncover all relevant information that might affect valuation. 
The next step is to decide on an appropriate valuation for the company, issue size, what types of units to issue, 
ownership structure, target investor mix, syndicate structure, use of lock-up period,  and how to price the transaction. 
Governance and control issues also need to be addressed in cooperation with legal experts, establishing the terms for 
the PA as part of the prospectus.  
The most common method to price an IPO in the U.S. today is the bookbuilding method. Other methods that can 
also be used are the fixed price method and the auction method. By using the bookbuilding method, the underwriter 
can deduce demand information from investors prior to the IPO to help price the issue. Preceding the launch of the 
IPO, the lead underwriter(s) will accompany the issuer management on a “road show” to meet with important 
investors and present the investment case. During the road show, the underwriter will “build a book” of demand as 
indicated by investor interest. By noting size interest and price ranges, the underwriter is in a position to change the 
initial valuation upwards or downwards before the actual launch of the IPO. 
The Marketing Phase 
The marketing phase is initiated by presenting the investment case to analysts and equity brokers within the 
syndicate banks. The finished IPO prospectus with indicative price range is then published online, and distributed to 
investors by request. The marketing phase overlaps with the preparatory phase, and includes the marketing of the 
investment case to investors and bookbuiling process. By the end of the marketing phase, the “book is closed”, and 
investors can no longer make requests for allocations in the IPO. Based on discussions with the issuer, the 
underwriter will proceed to go through the list of interested parties, and range investors in classes based on their 
indicated price, allocation size and whether they are considered long-term of short-term investors. Subject to certain 
legal limitations, the issuer and underwriter are hence given a fair amount of discretion with regards to the allocation 
of units and pricing. When the final offering price is decided, allocations are distributed to investors, and payment is 
collected. After the transaction is made, the units are registered at the exchange, and trading may commence. In the 
U.S., where MLP IPOs are launched, the final price is usually set the day prior to the IPO launch, which minimises 
the impact on valuation from general market movements. 
The Aftermarket Phase 
The aftermarket phase comprises services that the underwriter provides for the issuer during an extended time period 
after the listing. For example, the underwriter may receive the right to issue additional units, commonly called an 
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“over-allotment option”. This is one of the few SEC-permitted ways the underwriter can facilitate liquidity and price 
support for the IPO in the aftermarket. Typically, the size for an over-allotment option is around 15 per cent of the 
original issue. If the underwriter suspects that demand will be weak, the bank can allocate for example 30 per cent 
more units than indicated, and buy back the overshooting 15 per cent in the aftermarket at the depressed price. These 
units are then annulled, and the underwriter helps support the price of the issue. In the event that market demand is 
suspected to be strong, the underwriter can simply sell the extra 15 per cent it is entitled to, collect commission, and 
provide the issuer with additional issue proceeds. 
3.2   What is Underpricing? 
When firms issue equity to the public, the term “underpricing” is used to describe the systematic increase from the 
offer price to the first-day closing price. The wording in itself suggests that the shares issued were priced too low 
compared to the market clearing price, and that the firm could have achieved a higher valuation without jeopardising 
investor appetite. Essentially, underpricing thus represents a wealth transfer from existing owners to new investors. 
Existing owners get a lower price for shares sold, while new investors realise an immediate gain. A popular phrasing 
for this situation is to say that existing owners leave “money on the table” (defined as initial return multiplied by the 
number of shares issued) to the benefit of new investors.  
Empirically, underpricing is considered present when initial returns are significantly larger than zero. In some 
instances it can also be relevant to adjust for the returns of the underlying market, for example if the offer price is set 
at a time long before the actual offer date. In the time period between pricing announcement and the offering, events 
may have taken place that can influence both the valuation of the issuer and the market, and needs to be taken into 
consideration. Adjusting for market movements can be done by subtracting the return of an associated market index 
from initial returns in the relevant time period, alternatively adjusted for the firm’s beta value.  
3.2.1   Empirical Evidence 
Underpricing was first documented in the 1970s (Stoll and Curley, 1970; Logue, 1973; Reilly, 1973; Ibbotson, 
1975), and has since been reported across time, industries and geographies. Allowing for comparison, Loughran et 
al. (2012) lists results from research conducted in 48 countries all over the world. 
Most European and North American markets exhibit underpricing that fall within a 5 to 30 per cent bracket, with 
Greece as a clear exception at 50.8 per cent. Some interesting observations can be made with regards to differences 
between neighbouring countries. For example, the level of underpricing is markedly lower in Norway (9.6 per cent) 
than in Sweden (26.1 per cent), and also lower in France (10.5 per cent) than in Germany (24.2 per cent). Ljungqvist 
(2004) notes that such differences can be result of different institutional frameworks in the countries where the IPOs 
take place.  
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Figure 8. Underpricing Across Geographies – Europe and North America45 
 
Figure 9. Underpricing Across Geographies – Africa, Asia, Australia, and South America45 
 
For the non-European markets, several countries report much higher initial returns, with the extreme case of Saudi 
Arabia at 264.5 per cent in the time period from 2003 to 2010. Studies from China and Jordan also indicate 
substantial underpricing at 137.4 and 149 per cent respectively.  
In addition to variation in the level of underpricing between countries, underpricing is also known to vary across 
time. For example, while underpricing in the United States has been at an average 17 per cent since the 1960s, 
variation can be observed moving across years and even decades. From 1980 to 2011, underpricing averaged 17.9 
per cent, fluctuating in a range from 3.2 per cent in 1984 to 70.9 per cent in 1999. During the 2000s, average 
underpricing has been a bit lower, at 11.7 per cent46.   
                                                             
45 The two figures report equal weighed initial returns for 48 countries.  Initial return is calculated as the first-day closing price divided by 
the offer price less one. Exceptions are made in the case of France and Greece, where the fifth trading day closing price is used due to 
certain daily volatility limits on the stock exchanges. The data is collected from Loughran et al. (2012), who have sampled the results from 
various sources.  
46 Data on U.S. underpricing is collected from J. R. Ritter’s website, available from: [http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm] 
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3.2.2   Literature Review of Underpricing Theory 
While underpricing has become recognised as a ubiquitous phenomenon, there is no one hypothesis that has 
succeeded in fully explaining why underpricing exists. Theories can be categorised on various grounds; I have 
chosen to follow a hybrid setup based on Ljungqvist (2004) and Ritter and Welch (2002), and present theories based 
on whether they focus on asymmetric information, the allocation of shares, institutional explanations, or 
behavioural explanations. As noted in Ritter and Welch (2002), hypotheses that deal with the allocation of shares 
can be based both on the assumption of asymmetric information and symmetric information. As it represents a 
relatively new area of research however, I have decided to include a separate chapter for this particular part of 
literature.  
Theories Based on Asymmetric Information 
The term “asymmetric information” is used to describe relative information heterogeneity between parties in 
connection with a transaction. Put bluntly: one party knows more than the other, and can use this benefit at the 
expense of the other. If the cause of the information asymmetry comes into effect prior to the transaction, the direct 
consequence is adverse selection. If the cause of the information asymmetry comes into effect after the transaction 
however, this may indirectly result in moral hazard from the informed party.   
With regards to an IPO transaction, asymmetric information refers to information heterogeneity between the key 
parties involved prior to the transaction, namely between the issuing firm, the underwriter and investors buying the 
equity. 
Signalling Theories 
When the issuer is more informed than investors about the future cash flow prospects of a company, the investors 
face an adverse selection situation. Suppose there are two types of firms, high-quality and low-quality, and that 
investors are unable to distinguish between them. As a consequence, investors will only be willing to pay the average 
price for any one IPO. The rational investor will quickly conclude that only below-average-quality firms will be 
willing to issue equity at the average price, and hence demand an even lower price for IPOs. Increasingly, this will 
force high-quality IPOs out of the market, creating a “market for lemons” (Akerlof, 1970). Some theories maintain 
that high-quality firms underprice to signal their quality to investors and to “leave a good taste in investors’ mounts” 
(Ibbotson, 1975). Underpricing here represents a credible signal of quality to investors, as low-quality firms are 
assumed not to have the financial capacity to imitate the underpricing of high-quality firms. Undoubtedly, 
underpricing may be a high price to pay to signal quality. Signalling theories maintain however, that high-quality 
firms can recoup money left on the table at a later stage, through seasoned equity offerings (Welch, 1989), increased 
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analyst coverage (Chemmanur, 1993), or favourable market responses upon the future announcement of dividends 
(Allen and Faulhaber, 1989).  
The evidence supporting signalling models is mixed. For example, Jegadeesh et al. (1993) find that just like positive 
initial returns, subsequent returns are just as effective in explaining future issuing activity. Michaely and Shaw 
(1994) reject signalling, and find no relation between the level of underpricing and future issuing activity. It should 
also be noted that there are other potentially less costly ways to signal quality than underpricing, and hence that 
signalling cannot completely explain the phenomenon. For example, the entrepreneur can retain a sizeable share of 
equity upon the IPO, signalling belief in the future prospects of the firms (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Tirole, 2006). 
Also, more innovative structuring of the IPO transaction may be put to use.  For example, as Seadrill Ltd. did in 
connection with a secondary block sale of shares in March 2012, the issuer can attach put options to the shares 
issued if the value of the equity is considered truly secure. This strategy is risky and not likely to be pursued in IPOs, 
but would undoubtedly signal quality. 
Winner’s Curse Theories 
A second line of theories is based on the situation where the investors are more informed than the issuer about the 
value of the firm. In this situation, the issuer faces a placement problem, as it does not know the market demand for 
its IPO (Ritter and Welch, 2002). When the firm going public has not previously been traded in the market, there is 
no indicative price range available to value the operating assets of the firm. The challenge hence lies in establishing a 
valuation at which the IPO will attract sufficient investor interest. If the IPO is priced too high, the firm will not be 
able to raise the amount of equity financing needed, and if priced too low, the firm will forego funds. If assuming 
that all outside investors have the same superior information to the issuer, the result is that all successful IPOs will 
be underpriced. If assuming that investors are differently informed however, the outcome is uncertain.  
In Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse model, asymmetric information across investor classes is what necessitates 
underpricing. Rock (1986) assumes that there are two types of investors; the first consisting of outside investors who 
are better informed about the issuing firm’s value than the issuer and the underwriter, and the second of outside 
investors who are less informed. In a winner’s curse, the uninformed investor fears that he will only receive IPO 
allocations if he is among the most optimistic investors. As the informed investor will only bid on underpriced IPOs, 
such allocations will be rationed among the two groups. In overpriced IPOs however, informed investors will not 
participate, and the uninformed investor will receive a full allocation as requested. As a result, the average return to 
the uninformed investor, conditional on the allocation of shares, will be lower than the unconditional return, and 
possibly negative. Rock’s model further assumes that it is important for issuing firms to keep the uniformed 
investors in the market, as informed investors do not have the amount of capital necessary to absorb all IPOs. In 
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order to maintain uninformed investor participation, underpricing is thus viewed as an equilibrium requirement 
bringing average return to a break even. Koh and Walter (1989) test Rock’s theory using a unique data set on 
Singapore IPO allocations. During the 1980s, oversubscribed IPOs in Singapore were allocated based on random 
ballot, and hence not favouring any type of investor. The authors report that in fact, when allocations are adjusted for 
rationing, the average initial return falls from 27 to 1 per cent. Beatty and Ritter (1986) adds to Rock’s argument by 
noting that there is a positive association between the ex ante uncertainty in a firm’s value and the underpricing of its 
IPO. When ex ante uncertainty is larger, informed investors likely have a larger advantage to uninformed investors. 
Assuming that Rock’s model is correct, one can argue that it is easy to solve the undepricing puzzle. In order to 
mitigate underpricing, the information asymmetry across investor classes must simply be reduced. With no 
information asymmetry, no underpricing. Michaely and Shaw (1994) use the perceived information heterogeneity 
between institutional and retail investors to test winner’s curse models such as that of Rock (1986). Institutional 
investors are highly specialised persons or entities which are responsible for large scale capital placements on a 
regular basis. Consequently, institutional investors are more dependent on, and able to, acquire costly information 
than retail investors. Michaely and Shaw (1994) conduct a comparison of underpricing across asset classes, using a 
sample of 59 MLP IPOs and 778 corporate IPOs from 1984 to 1988. They argue that since the institutional investors 
largely avoided MLPs in the 1980s, the information asymmetry between investor classes was likely to be less for 
MLP IPOs than corporate IPOs. They list two explanations as to why institutional participation can result in 
underpricing. The first explanation relates to information asymmetry between institutions and retail investors, 
claiming that institutions will receive more underpriced IPO allocations as they are able to bid more for them when 
knowing the underlying true value. The second explanation relate to the allocation of shares of an IPO, stating that 
institutions are favoured by investment banks since they are more important clients than retail investors. The results 
from empirical tests find no significant underpricing within the MLP sample, versus a significant 8.5 per cent initial 
return for the corporations.  
Muscarella (1988) conducts a similar test on a sample of 50 MLP IPOs executed from 1983 to 1987. Results are 
(predictably) similar to Michaealy and Shaw (1994), showing no indication of significant underpricing. Muscarella 
looks to theories presented by Baron (1982) and Rock (1986) that imply that uncertainty regarding the issuer’s 
market value should be related to greater IPO underpricing. Based on the content of these papers, Muscarella 
concludes that there might be less uncertainty regarding the pricing of MLPs, and that the seemingly correct pricing 
of MLP units is consistent with an efficient capital market. Michaely and Shaw (1994) also control for ex ante 
uncertainty in their tests, using the dollar value of the IPO and an industry classification dummy as proxies for 
uncertainty. They report that these factors do not seem to impact underpricing significantly for the MLP sample. 
Ritter and Welch (2002) notes that the IPOs of non-operating companies, such as mutual funds, are generally not 
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underpriced. Hence, one could also consider the question whether MLPs exhibit characteristics similar to non-
operating firms, or if investors have valued IPOs in a similar fashion to non-operating investment vehicles. 
Information Revelation Theories 
With the widespread introduction of bookbuilding as the preferred way of building demand for an IPO, underwriters 
have been granted more discretion in the way IPO allocations are made. Bookbuilding, as opposed to fixed price 
issues, involves the soliciting of demand prior to the IPO, where the underwriter bases the final pricing decision on 
indicated demand from investors. The underwriter will first set an indicative price range, and then go on a “road 
show” with the issuer management to market the IPO investment story. Based on the response from investors, the 
underwriter builds a book of indicated demand. If outside investors are better informed about the value of the issuing 
firm, this process allows the underwriter to level information asymmetry and reduce underpricing. However, 
informed investors are not likely to reveal such information without incentives, as it would reduce potential initial 
returns for the investor. Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benviste and Wilhem (1990) and Spatt and Srivastava (1991) 
argue that bookbuilding can allow the underwriter to give larger, and potentially underpriced allocations to investors 
who reveal that they are willing to purchase the share at a higher price.   
Empirical tests generally support information revelation theories. Hanley (1993) finds a positive association between 
the level of underpricing and the upward revision of the offer price from the indicative price range. This suggests 
that when underwriters receive information indicating that the IPO can be sold at a higher offer price, they do not 
fully adjust the price. Instead, underwriters adjusts price upwards to maintain a constant underpricing, perhaps to 
compensate informed investors for revealing information. Ritter and Welch (2002) reports, however, that for a 
sample of 6,238 U.S. IPOs from 1980 to 2001, underpricing was on average 52.7 per cent when conditional on 
upward price adjustment. They argue that surely, this level of underpricing appears to be too large to be considered 
solely as compensation for revealing information. 
Principal-Agent Theories 
Baron (1982) propose a model where the issuer is less informed than the underwriter, and allows the underwriter 
some discretion with regards to underpricing in order to avoid monitoring costs, and to encourage the underwriter to 
make an effort in marketing the issue.  
Criticism of the principal-agent theories includes the observation that when banks themselves go public, the IPOs are 
also usually underpriced (Muscarealla and Vetsuypens, 1989). This contradicts the notion that absent of information 
asymmetry between the issuer and underwriter, the IPO should not be underpriced. Ljungqvist (2004) also note that 
banks are paid by form of commission, which in turn depends on the amount of proceeds gained from the IPO. One 
can thus argue that banks should have an incentive not to underprice IPOs. Further, any large pricing error might 
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negatively affect the reputation of the bank, and discourage future issuers to approach the bank. Supporting this 
statement, Michaely and Shaw (1994) address the impact of having a prestigious investment bank as an underwriter 
for an issue. They find that IPOs underwritten by top-tier banks are less underpriced on average. Others, such as 
Loughran and Ritter (2004), have found that the association between underpricng and top-tier bank underwriters has 
changed over time. Moving into the 1990s, top-tier banks underpriced more. Loughran and Ritter (2004) explain this 
shift with the changing issuer objective function, which proposes that issuers moved to choose underwriters based on 
whether they would receive better analyst coverage, and whether decision makers would receive personal allocations 
in underpriced IPOs. They propose that when choosing an underwriter the issuer seeks to maximize the total of IPO 
proceeds, proceeds from future sales, and side payments. In order to do this, issuers increasingly turned to 
underwriters who were willing to distribute underpriced allocations to “family and friends” of management, hence 
increasing the personal wealth of issuer decision makers. 
Theories Focusing on the Allocation of IPOs 
In recent years, literature has increasingly turned towards the allocation of shares during IPOs in trying to explain the 
underpricing puzzle. The shift is motivated both by the widespread public attention towards the unfairness in 
allocations given the large sums of “money left on the table”, but also by improved information availability. 
Many empirical papers focus in particular on the distinction between institutional and retail investors (Cornelli and 
Goldreich, 2001; Aggarwal et al., 2002). As previously discussed, Rock (1986) argues that underpricing is an 
equilibrium requirement in order to attract retail investors to participate in IPO allocations. Rock (1986) posit that 
since institutional investors have superior information to retail investors about the true value of IPOs, they will only 
bid on cheap allocations, or “hot IPOs”, leaving retail investors with a disproportionate share of expensive 
allocations. And, as documented by Aggarwal et al. (2002), and Hanley et al. (1995), institutional investors do 
receive large allocations of underpriced IPOs. Chemmanur et al. (2010)  explore the subsequent trading patterns of 
institutional investors receiving IPO allocations from 1999 to 2004, and find that a 70.2 per cent share of IPO 
allocations is sold within the first year post-IPO, fully realising money left on the table. Interestingly, institutional 
investors are found to hold allocations with weaker post-issue demand for a longer period of time, and are rewarded 
for this activity by underwriters in the form of subsequent hot IPO allocations. Chemmanur et al. (2010) conclude 
that institutional investors “possess significant private information about IPOs, play an important supportive role in 
the IPO aftermarket, and receive considerable compensation for their participation in IPOs”. 
As noted in Ritter and Welch (2002), underpricing can be preferred by the issuer if it creates enough excess demand 
preceding the IPO so that the issuer and underwriter can choose whom to allocate shares to. For example, Stoughton 
and Zechner (1998) argue that getting block holders at the IPO can create a positive externality for retail investors, as 
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a block holder is more likely to function as a corporate control mechanism through monitoring management. They 
further suggest that in order to attract block holder attention, underpricing is a necessary incentive. Hence, 
institutional investor participation in IPOs may be related to underpricing. Institutional investors have larger amounts 
of capital at hand, and are more likely to be block holders than retail investors. 
Brennan and Franks (1997) propose a theory where the issuer allows underpricing in order to retain control and 
minimise monitoring by outsiders. By underpricing the IPO, the issuer can execute discretion in the allocation of 
shares, and for example achieve a target retail investor percentage. With dispersed ownership, it is less likely that 
investors will monitor management directly; instead they will “vote with their feet” through selling or buying the 
share. 
Theories Based on Institutional Explanations 
Institutional theories look to structural market characteristics to explain underpricing. Legal and tax issues represent 
one part of this literature, while another relates to price stabilisation in the aftermarket. 
Legal Responsibility 
When a company lists for public trading, it is subject to strict disclosure requirements regarding the state of its 
business. This is particularly true in the U.S., where the underwriter may be sued by investors if they perceive that 
the information provided in the IPO prospectus was misleading47. Lowry and Shu (2002) examine the association 
between litigation risk and IPO underpricing, and find evidence that firms with higher litigation risk underprice their 
IPOs more. Exploring a sample of 1,841 U.S. IPOs from 1988 to 1995, they find that around 6 per cent of the firms 
are sued after their IPOs. The same conclusion can be drawn from tests conducted in other geographies, such as 
Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, and Japan (Ljungqvist, 2004). In order to avoid 
litigation, underpricing can be used as an “insurance buffer” (Tinic, 1988; Hensler, 1995). If an issue is underpriced, 
investors receive initial returns, and are less likely to feel tricked by the issuer and underwriter. If the cost of 
underpricing is lower than the potential cost of litigation, this can be considered a viable strategy for the underwriter.  
Tax Issues 
If the capital gains tax is lower than the income tax rate, a firm can use undepricing as a means of compensating 
managers and other employers. If the company is able to allocate enough shares to inside investors, the net tax 
benefit of this type of compensation might be higher than the cost of underpricing on shares allocated to outside 
investors. Dandapani et al. (1994) argue that in the presence of tax and for certain levels of entrepreneur retained 
equity, underpricing can be preferential to the issuer. The paper presents a simulation model assuming income tax 
                                                             
47 Under the Securities Act of 1933 Section 11, investors are entitled to sue the issuing firm of an IPO for material untruths or omissions 
made in the IPO prospectus. The legislation is directly linked to the pricing decision, as any lawsuit liability is payable based on the 
differential between the offering price and the market price at the time the lawsuit was filed. 
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from 40 to 70 per cent, and capital gains tax at 50 per cent of the respective income tax bracket. Through simulation, 
they find that for retention levels between 66.6 and 100 per cent, underpricing benefits the entrepreneur. Results vary 
with tax regimes however, and the paper argues that underpricing should be less after the 1987 (in the U.S.) change 
in capital gains tax. As tax regimes are constantly revised by politicians, this theory is not widely supported by 
empirical tests, but can hold in certain periods of time when tax regimes are highly skewed. 
Aftermarket Stabilisation 
In connection with an IPO, one of the services provided by the underwriter to the issuing firm is price stabilisation. 
In the event the share price should drop following the IPO, the underwriter will pick up shares in the market to 
support the price for a pre-defined period of time. As a result, aftermarket stabilisation can remove some of the left 
tail end observations in the distribution of returns, converting negative returns into zeros because underwriters are 
supporting the offering price (Ruud, 1993). The price stabilisation commitment from the underwriter’s side can be 
considered as a put option written by the underwriter to the IPO participants, hence mitigating the winner’s curse for 
uninformed investors. It also sends signals to the market that the underwriter will not intentionally overprice the 
issue in order to boost commissions. Aftermarket support of an overpriced IPO is likely much more costly to the 
bank than any additional payments received from higher commissions. 
Theories Focusing on Behavioural Explanations 
Some researchers focus on behavioural aspects related to demand side participants in order to explain IPO 
underpricing. In the late 1990s, initial returns skyrocketed. In the U.S., underpricing reached an average 70.9 per 
cent in 1999, and U.S. issuers left over USD 62 billion on the table during 1999 and 2000 (Ljungqvist, 2004). Many 
researchers turned to behavioural theories following the dot-com bubble, doubtful that other developed theories 
could possibly motivate the level of underpricing observed in the market. Behavioural theories revolve mainly 
around two assumptions. The first category assumes that investors are irrational, and liable to bid up the price 
beyond its true value. The second category assumes that the issuer is irrational, and subject to behavioural biases in 
decision making, thus failing to push the underwriter to lower underpricing.  
Negative Cascade Theories 
Welch (1992) proposes that information asymmetry across investor classes can lead to a negative cascade in the 
event an IPO is priced too high. In this theory, investors move like sheep herds, observing the moves of “leading” 
informed investors before deciding whether or not to participate in IPOs. The informed investor will only participate 
in IPOs that are underpriced, and so the uninformed investor expects to profit by only participating in IPOs when 
informed investors do.  The negative cascade hypothesis claims that because the probability of complete failure is so 
high when the IPO is only marginally overpriced, the issuer will underprice to make sure there is sufficient demand 
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for the IPO. Welch’s (1992) hypothesis is supported by the tendency for IPOs to be either hugely oversubscribed, or 
undersubscribed (Amihud et al., 2001), with very few moderately subscribed issues. 
Investor Sentiment 
Theories about investor sentiment assume that some investors behave irrationally in the market place, basing their 
valuation of firms on subjective information. This can lead to unfounded valuations, where investors either overvalue 
or undervalue a company’s shares. The assumption is particularly relevant in the context of IPOs, when there has 
previously been no public market for the company’s equity, and information about the underlying business is not 
readily available. Relatively more optimistic investors will then be willing to pay more for a share than its true value, 
while pessimistic investors will be limited in their activity since short selling is not possible prior to the shares being 
issued. As a result, the issuing firm will benefit if it is able to allocate all shares to these optimistic investors. In 
practice however, this poses some challenges, as (1) the optimistic investors might not be able to absorb the entire 
issue, and (2) it may not be legal to discriminate on price between buyers in the allocation. Ljungqvist et al. (2006) 
model the issuer’s optimal response to the presence of sentiment investors, suggesting that the issuer should allocate 
a larger share of the issue to “regulars” (usually institutional investors), who then might proceed to sell the 
overshooting allocation to irrational investors in the secondary market. The authors note that since carrying an extra 
inventory of shares is risky, the issuer underprices to compensate regulars for the risk. The issuer still benefits, 
however, as the offer price is able to capitalise part of the expected trading gain of regulars. Thus, the investor 
sentiment theory explains underpricing by irrational investors’ miscalculated valuations, and not by too low pricing 
on the hand of the issuer and underwriter. The theory projects that when short selling is permitted in the market 
place, valuations will revert to reflect the true value of the firm, consistent with empirical evidence on long-run 
negative IPO returns (Ritter, 1991). 
Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting 
Prospect theory is a descriptive theory first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Prospect theory deals with 
the decision making of individuals’ under uncertainty, and explains deviations from for example expected utility 
maximisation by individuals being subject to cognitive biases. Loughran and Ritter (2002) apply prospect theory to 
explain underpricing, attributing the cause of underpricing to the mental accounting of the issuer. Mental accounting 
refers to the process where people mentally categorise current and future assets, and assign different levels of utility 
to the different categories. In the context of an IPO, the issuer places both proceeds received from the issue itself, 
and personal wealth accretion on retained ownership shares, into the same current category. Balancing the cost of 
underpricing and the benefit of first day returns, the issuer willingly lets the underwriter underprice the issue. 
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3.3   Analysis 
In the following subchapter, I will present an analysis based on the underpricing phenomenon in the context of MLP 
IPOs. First, I present my hypothesis founded on relevant theory presented in the literature review. Second, I proceed 
to describe my sample, how it was collected and what criteria have been employed in the sampling process. Third, I 
will move on to discuss different underpricing methodology and measurement. Fourth, test results are presented and 
analysed in light of the thesis objective. Finally, criticisms and suggestions for future research are presented. 
3.3.1   Hypothesis – Winner’s Curse 
The winner’s curse hypothesis assumes that underpricing is necessary in order to compensate uninformed investors 
facing adverse selection in IPO allocations. In Michealy and Shaw’s paper (1994), information heterogeneity 
between retail and institutional investors is used as a proxy to test the winner’s curse hypothesis. During the 1980s, 
institutional investors were largely deterred from owning MLPs due to restrictive regulations. Following Michaely 
and Shaw’s (1994) argumentation, regular retail investors did not face adverse selection in the context of MLP IPOs, 
and hence did not demand a premium in the form of underpricing to participate in issues. Since the 1980s however, 
the investor mix has changed for MLPs. Most notably, the passing of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 made 
it easier for regulated investment companies to invest directly in MLPs, and brought about institutional investors as a 
more meaningful source of financing. Prior to 2004, MLPs were primarily owned by retail investors, with 
institutions holding only a 10 per cent ownership share. Since the passing of the American Jobs Creation Act 
however, institutional investors have increased ownership share to approximately 32 per cent by the end of 3Q 2012.  
Consistent with the findings of this chapter I propose a hypothesis that the influx of institutional investors to the 
MLP space may have widened the knowledge level gap across investor classes, or rather, increased information 
asymmetry. In order to examine whether the presence of information asymmetry can explain the underpricing 
phenomenon, I will adopt the line of reasoning set forth in Michaely and Shaw’s (1994) paper.  
Hypothesis: In issues where there is no a priori knowledge of information heterogeneity across investor classes, 
uninformed investors do not face a winner’s curse, and underpricing is not necessary.  
3.3.2   Sample Description 
The sample used to test the hypothesis consists of 100 MLP IPOs launched from June 1994 through November 2012. 
Initial firm data were sampled with the assistance of the National Association of Publicly Traded Partnerships 
(“NAPTP”), which contributed a comprehensive list of all MLP IPOs they had registered in the period from 1978 
through September 2012. The data included (1) name of the MLP, (2) stock exchange, (3) trading ticker, (4) date of 
IPO, (5) date left market, and (6) industry segment. Moving through October and November of 2012, I added 
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observations to the initial sample as more MLPs launched their IPOs. By November 2012, the initial sample 
comprised of 291 MLP IPOs, after adjusting for duplicates found in the initial firm sample. 
In order to approach the data collection in a structured manner, I first established a set of requirements for final 
sample eligibility. Initially, I wanted to include as many observations as possible, and aspired to include all eligible 
IPOs from 1978 through 2012. As I moved on with the data sampling however, I realised that offering data for IPOs 
prior to 1990 was not readily available through the databases I had access to. As a result, I decided to include 
requirement (3) mid-process.  
For my final sample, requirements for eligibility include the following: 
1. The MLP’s main source of revenue must be of non-financial character;  
2. The IPO prospectus must be available through the SEC EDGAR system; 
3. The IPO took place in the time period from 1990 through November 2012; 
4. The MLP was listed in CRSP and COMPUSTAT following the IPO (exception made for 2012 IPOs); 
5. The IPO was executed by way of a public cash offer. 
The excluding of non-operating MLP IPOs is in line with previous IPO valuation literature (see for example 
Aggarwal et al. 2009), and motivated by the different nature of operating and financial MLPs. To determine which 
firms should be excluded based on industry classification, the segment information provided by NAPTP gave some 
guidance. In addition, SIC codes indicating industry classification were obtained through the Wharton Research Data 
Services’ Center for Research in Securities Prices (“WRDS CRSP”) daily tapes for MLPs that were listed in CRSP. 
46 non-operating MLPs, mostly financial advisors and MLPs dealing in mortgage securities (SIC code ranging from 
6000 to 6999), were removed from the sample based on this first exercise. Three MLPs that the NAPTP indicated 
were of financial character were listed in CRPS with erroneous SIC codes. These firms were removed based on own 
research. Further, five royalty trusts were removed from the sample.  
Second, I began searching the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval (“EDGAR”) system to 
retrieve IPO prospectuses. Prospectuses can be found by locating 424B filings stored in the EDGAR system. As a 
substantial part the prospectuses for MLPs launching in the 1980s were not available, I performed a parallel search 
for relevant offering data for all MLPs through CRSP and COMPUSTAT. For most 1980s IPOs, relevant data were 
also missing for firms listed in CRSP and COMPUSTAT. As a result, I decided to look only at IPOs launched from 
1990 to 2012. This immediately excluded another 122 IPOs from the sample. For IPOs launched in the 1990s, I was 
unable to retrieve 424B filings for 19 MLPs.  
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Lastly, MLPs that did not execute their IPOs by way of a public cash offer were removed from the sample. One 
MLP was excluded based on this requirement, namely Atlas Resource Partners LP.  
This procedure yielded a total of 100 unique MLP IPOs for the final sample. 
Offering Data 
For IPOs from 1990 to 2011, data on offer date were collected from the initial NAPTP sample. All dates were cross-
checked by collecting units’ initial trading date using the WRDS CRSP database. When dates differed, the IPO date 
was checked against 424B filings from the SEC EDGAR system, and articles published on the Wall Street Journal 
web site. For IPOs in 2012, data on offer date were collected from IPO prospectuses and articles on the Wall Street 
Journal web site. 
Data on offer prices were hand collected from 424B filings, which were sampled from the SEC EDGAR system. 
After rejecting the validity of data on post-IPO units outstanding collected from CRSP, these too were hand collected 
from the offering prospectuses. This was a lengthy, but necessary process. CRSP typically reports common units 
outstanding as the total amount of units outstanding, excluding subordinated equity classes. For the final sample, 79 
MLPs had subordinated units as part of their post-IPO equity structure, of which 47 maintained a minimum 49 per 
cent level. Not accounting for subordinated and general partner interests would have substantially distorted the 
sample characteristics.  
Other offering data used in this paper that were hand collected from 424B filings include distribution targets and 
distribution policy characteristics, estimated taxable income to distributions ratio, election of tax status, net proceeds, 
the use of proceeds, identity of lead underwriters and syndicate banks, syndicate size, size of over-allotment option, 
and asset types. 
Unit Price and S&P 500 Composite Index Return Data 
Unit price and initial return data for the 20 first days after the IPO were collected from CRSP. For the IPOs launched 
in 2012, return data were sampled from Bloomberg. In both instances, the closing price on the first day of trading 
was used to calculate initial return. The similar approach was used when collecting return data on the S&P 500 
Composite Index. 
Underwriter Ranking Data 
Underwriter ranking is considered an important variable in underpricing literature, and exists in many forms. For my 
sample, I used the rankings produced by Loughran and Ritter described in Appendix C of their 2004 paper "Why 
Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?”. The data have been updated through 2011, and are available from 
Ritter’s web site using the following link: [http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm]. The ranking system is 
62 
 
based on work by Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter et al. (1998), and the authors own work. The system ranks 
banks on a scale from 0 to 9, with 9 being the highest. For 2012, the ranking used in 2011 was assigned. I also tried 
assigning the average ranking used over the last three years, which gave no difference in the data. 
3.3.3   Method for Measuring Underpricing 
Underpricing is a widely covered topic in finance literature, and typically refers to the first-day return on issued 
equity. There are different ways to measure underpricing empirically, and in the following I will present two such 
methods.  
Simple Initial Return Model 
Most studies about underpricing use simple initial return to measure underpricing. For example, this is the method 
used in both of the articles that have previously been written about MLP underpricing (Muscarella, 1988; Michaely 
and Shaw, 1994).  
The initial return of unit i, is defined as      
  
    
 
  
 , where 
     the first day return of unit i; 
  
   the IPO offer price for unit i; 
  
   the first day closing price for unit i 
It is important to be aware of the implicit assumptions being made when using the simple initial return model. First, 
the model assumes that all relevant information is reflected by the closing price on the first trading day48. This is 
probably an unproblematic assumption to make if the IPOs take place in an efficient equity capital market, where 
there are many market participants and no restrictions placed on price movements by regulators. In some markets 
however, this is not the case. Price movement limits have been used in many countries after the 1987 stock market 
crash to control unfounded intraday price movements. Such countries include for example France, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Greece, Belgium, Netherlands, and Switzerland (Nobanee et al., 2010). Price limits have also been used in 
the U.S., but only for derivatives such as futures, not for equity. When there are price limits, it will make more sense 
to measure underpricing as the return between the offer price and the closing price at a later point in time. The same 
conclusion can hold in situations where there are few market participants, or where the actual trading process does 
not work efficiently. In some studies conducted prior to the 1980s, underpricing is measured on a weekly or even 
monthly basis (Logue, 1973; Ibbotson, 1975).  
                                                             
48 Some empirical research also calculates underpricing based on the market opening price the day after the IPO. Ritter and Welch (2002) 
state that the opening price is considered an unbiased indicator for the preceding day closing price, and that results have proved insensitive 
to the use of either two methods.  
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Second, the model assumes that there has not been any major shift in the market since the offer price was set, and 
that the offer price thus reflects the value of the firm given the market conditions at the time of the IPO. In some 
countries, the offer price can be set several days prior to the IPO. If there is a major upward shift in the market 
between the day the offer price is set and the day of the IPO, it is implied that the valuation of the firm going public 
should also shift upward. First-day returns will thus likely be positive. When adjusting for the overall market 
movement between the offer price setting and the launch however, it becomes clear that the positive return cannot be 
fully attributed to underpricing. In the U.S., where MLP IPOs are launched, the offer price in normally set the day 
immediately preceding the listing day.  
Simple Market Adjustment Model 
There are several ways to adjust for market movements. The common denominator for all of them however, is that 
the simple initial return is adjusted by the return of a relevant index over the relevant time period. Consequently, the 
selection of the market index is of utmost importance to determine the extent of underpricing when employing a 
market adjustment model. 
Some firms will be less affected by market movements than others, which some models take into account by 
adjusting the market return by the company’s beta value. This is challenging in particular for IPOs, since the beta 
value does not theoretically exist for non-listed companies. One way to estimate beta is to look at the beta values of 
comparable companies, and adjust for differences in leverage. Loughran and Ritter (2002) point out however, that 
non-listed firms are likely to have much higher betas than seasoned firms, which makes this method problematic.  
Another way to adjust for market movement is to assume that on average, companies will have a beta of one (similar 
to the market beta), and adjust all observations for the simple index return without beta adjustment. This is in line 
with early research such as Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975). 
The IPO initial abnormal return is defined by:            , where  
     the first day return of unit i   
  
    
 
  
 ; 
  
   the IPO offer price for unit i; 
  
   the first day closing price for unit i; 
     Return on the index at time t   
  
    
 
  
 , where 
  
   the index  opening quotation on the offering date for unit i; 
  
   the index closing quotation on the offering date for unit i 
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Choice of Measurement Method 
For the purpose of making results directly comparable with previous MLP IPO research, I have chosen to use the 
simple return model to test my hypothesis. Taking into account that IPOs launched in the U.S. are not affected by 
price movement limitations imposed by regulators, and that IPOs are usually priced the day prior to the IPO, this 
choice seems unproblematic.  
3.3.4   Underpricing Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The sample average simple initial return is 5.51 per cent. Using the market adjusted model with the S&P 500 
Composite Index as a benchmark, the average return is marginally higher at 5.52 per cent (assuming a beta of 1). The 
models yield only marginally different results, which suggest that the use of the simple initial return model is not 
inappropriate for further analysis. 
Table 7. Simple Initial Returns and Simple Market Adjusted Initial Returns 
  Simple Initial Return Market Adjusted 
Average return 5.51 % 5.52 % 
25th percentile -0.07 % -0.48 % 
Median 3.62 % 3.42 % 
75th percentile 10.31 % 10.67 % 
Minimum -6.84 % -8.56 % 
Maximum 33.27 % 33.48 % 
Skewness 1.16 1.06 
Standard deviation 8.33 % 8.43 % 
 
The average return is an equally weighted arithmetic return, and might give a biased impression of the data. A better 
way to get a sense of the distribution is to look at the percentiles and median. The median is slightly lower than the 
average at 3.62 per cent, meaning the sample is skewed to the right. I have calculated the skewness49 of the 
distribution, which for the full sample equals 1.16.  
 
 
 
                                                             
49 If the sample is normally distributed, the observations will be symmetrical around the mean, and skewness will equal zero. 
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Figure 10. Distribution Frequency of Observations 
 
The skewness can be illustrated graphically by looking at the frequency of initial return by percentage brackets. As 
should be expected, most observations are found around zero. Relatively more observations can be found on the right 
side of the distribution than on the left side. The right tail is longer and includes more extreme observations, inflating 
the average initial return of the sample. 
Table 8. Initial Returns by Year 
Year Number of IPOs 
Average Initial 
Return 
Min. Initial 
Return 
Median Initial 
Return 
Max. Initial 
Return 
Standard 
Deviation 
1994 1 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % NM 
1996 4 0.60 % 0.00 % 0.30 % 1.79 % 0.84 % 
1998 2 -1.14 % -2.27 % -1.14 % 0.00 % 1.61 % 
1999 2 -0.34 % -0.99 % -0.34 % 0.30 % 0.91 % 
2000 1 -4.81 % -4.81 % -4.81 % -4.81 % NM 
2001 4 10.95 % 6.82 % 9.86 % 17.27 % 4.67 % 
2002 6 -0.64 % -6.84 % -1.16 % 7.80 % 4.92 % 
2004 5 9.79 % 4.49 % 10.34 % 15.28 % 4.79 % 
2005 9 13.86 % -2.82 % 14.53 % 29.11 % 9.55 % 
2006 18 2.52 % -5.26 % 0.58 % 19.05 % 5.97 % 
2007 14 8.63 % -3.75 % 3.94 % 33.27 % 12.20 % 
2008 3 1.14 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 3.42 % 1.98 % 
2010 6 3.18 % -4.50 % 4.43 % 9.50 % 5.90 % 
2011 13 3.03 % -5.00 % 0.26 % 11.90 % 5.56 % 
2012 12 9.57 % -2.94 % 11.26 % 23.64 % 7.63 % 
       
As can be observed in Table 8, underpricing varies across years. Prior to 2004, initial returns are chiefly in the low 
positives or negative, with an odd deviation in 2001, when underpricing was 10.95 per cent on average. All four 
IPOs in 2001 were underpriced, with Shamrock Logistics Partners LP pulling up the average at 17.27 per cent. The 
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standard deviation illustrates the degree of variation in underpricing within a year. A trend that can be observed is 
that prior to 2004, standard deviations were below 5 per cent for any one year, while they were generally larger after 
2004. An exception is found in 2008 when the financial crisis hit. In 2008, only three MLP IPOs were closed. 2008 
saw relatively low underpricing and standard deviation compared to other years.  
Table 9. Initial Returns by Industry  
Industry Number of IPOs 
Average Initial 
Return 
Min. Initial 
Return 
Median Initial 
Return 
Max. Initial 
Return 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coal 7 1.14 % -3.00 % -0.99 % 9.50 % 5.36 % 
Downstream 15 6.24 % -2.94 % 1.79 % 23.69 % 7.63 % 
Maritime 9 8.08 % -6.84 % 10.44 % 24.42 % 10.63 % 
Midstream 50 6.13 % -5.26 % 4.28 % 33.27 % 9.26 % 
Other minerals 3 8.86 % -0.75 % 9.69 % 17.65 % 9.23 % 
Upstream 16 2.74 % -1.57 % 1.23 % 10.77 % 3.87 % 
 
As shown in the above table, underpricing also varies across industries. Other minerals, which include fertilizer and 
monocrystalline sand producers, are underpriced the most at 8.86 per cent on average, while maritime transporters 
are underpriced 8.08 per cent. Coal producers face the lowest underpricing across industries at 1.14 per cent.  
Table 10. Initial Returns by Type of MLP 
Type of MLP Number of IPOs 
Average Initial 
Return 
Min. Initial 
Return 
Median Initial 
Return 
Max. Initial 
Return 
Standard 
Deviation 
Non-GP 87 5.68 % -6.84 % 3.82 % 33.27 % 8.39 % 
GP 13 4.40 % -4.53 % 0.30 % 23.69 % 8.15 % 
 
It is also possible to look at underpricing levels based the MLP type. There are two main types of MLPs within the 
sample; GPs and operating MLPs. In essence, a GP is a leveraged play on the underlying MLP’s assets. The 
valuation of a GP is extra sensitive to growth assumptions with regards to distributions, as certain growth levels will 
trigger IDRs and substantially boost the GPs cash flows.  The descriptive statistics for MLP types show that GPs and 
non-GPs both experience underpricing on average.  
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Table 11. Initial Returns and Fundamental Characteristics by Year 
              
Post-Issue 
Valuation   
IPO Year 
Number of 
IPOs 
% Δ 
Offer/First-
Day 
Number of 
Managing 
Underwriters 
Syndicate 
Size 
Money on 
the Table 
Gross 
Proceeds 
Offer 
Price 
Market 
Price 
Pro-
Forma 
Sales 
1994 1 0.00 % 5.0 5.0 0.0 275.1 657.7 657.7 541.9 
1996 4 0.60 % 3.3 4.8 1.0 136.4 243.2 245.2 1233.2 
1998 2 -1.14 % 5.0 7.0 -3.0 262.9 1058.7 1041.6 1383.4 
1999 2 -0.34 % 2.5 5.0 -0.4 191.5 332.4 331.5 196.0 
2000 1 -4.81 % 2.0 2.0 -0.9 19.5 41.7 39.7 7.1 
2001 4 10.21 % 3.0 4.5 9.8 92.0 290.8 323.3 91.4 
2002 6 0.90 % 4.0 4.5 1.2 83.3 290.7 298.8 423.6 
2004 5 9.79 % 4.4 4.4 10.1 106.0 243.9 267.0 137.0 
2005 9 13.86 % 2.6 4.1 16.3 153.3 758.1 834.3 1644.1 
2006 18 1.99 % 2.8 7.4 3.4 208.7 773.1 789.6 757.0 
2007 14 8.04 % 2.2 7.1 22.2 226.5 831.5 905.8 162.5 
2008 3 1.14 % 3.0 12.0 1.8 263.7 697.5 703.8 83.6 
2010 6 3.18 % 4.8 12.0 7.3 269.3 1202.6 1247.0 290.7 
2011 13 3.03 % 3.2 7.3 9.0 186.9 608.6 639.0 177.3 
2012 12 8.59 % 3.9 7.3 19.8 243.5 932.0 1003.0 1345.4 
Total 100 5.28 % 3.2 6.8 10.1 192.1 693.6 731.8 638.5 
 
Table 11 displays tendencies in different characteristics for MLP IPOs by year. Figures are given as arithmetic 
means, and are provided to illustrate that while underpricing has increased over the last decade, so has the average 
syndicate size, IPO size (gross proceeds) and value of MLPs going public implied by the offer price. For a more 
intuitive comprehension of the trends, selected data are provided for the full sample in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Trends in Fundamental Characteristics 
  
  
The figures show a clear trend for MLP IPOs to have increased in both offer size, syndicate size, and the amount of 
equity retained by existing owners. The graph displaying money left of the table shows an upward trend line, but 
with a larger dispersion around the line moving towards 2012.  
Test Results - Winner’s Curse Hypothesis  
I test the winner’s curse hypothesis by dividing the sample into two groups containing IPOs prior to and after 2004 
respectively. This is motivated by the passing of the AJCA 04, which allowed for more meaningful institutional 
participation in MLP IPOs.  
Table 12. Initial Returns by Time Period – Before and After the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
Time Period Number of IPOs Average Initial Return Median Initial Return T-Statistic P-Value 
Pre 2004 20 1.73 % 0.01 % 1.33 0.10 
Post 2004 80 6.36 % 4.64 % 6.70 0.00 
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The mean initial return for the pre-2004 sample is positive (1.73 per cent) and insignificantly different from zero at a 
5 per cent level. For the 80 IPOs launched after 2004, the mean initial return is positive (6.36 per cent) and 
significantly larger than zero at the 1 per cent level. The difference between the two sample returns is significant (t-
statistic = 2.92, p-value = 0.006).  
As the graphs showing trends in fundamental characteristics suggest, the average IPO size is larger for the MLPs 
listed after 2004 than for the ones listed before, at USD 207.4 million vs. USD 130.8 million. The average syndicate 
size is also larger for post-2004 issues, with an average 7.28 banks participating in transactions vs. 4.75 banks for 
pre-2004 IPOs. By and large, most MLP IPOs are underwritten by top tier ranking banks, and the two groups are not 
very different in this respect. Employing the ranking system of Loughran and Ritter (2004), the pre-2004 sample on 
average had a maximum ranking bank among the lead underwriters with a rank at 8.28, while the post-2004 
syndicates had an average maximum ranking at 8.68.  Existing owners also retain a larger share of issued equity after 
2004 than prior to 2004, at 67.27 per cent vs. 59.69 per cent respectively.  
Table 13. Pearson Correlation between Initial Returns and Selected Fundamental Characteristics 
 
Initial Return Post-2004 Dummy IPO Size Retention Rate Total Syndicate 
      
Post-2004 Dummy 0.228 
    
 
0.022* 
    
      
IPO Size -0.01 0.268 
   
 
0.923 0.007** 
   
      
Retention Rate 0.073 0.236 0.102 
  
 
0.468 0.018* 0.315 
  
      
      
Total Syndicate 0.005 0.308 0.612 0.147 
 
 
0.959 0.002** 0** 0.145 
 
      
Max Ranking 0.092 0.218 0.445 0.106 0.376 
 
0.362 0.029* 0** 0.296 0** 
 
The Pearson correlation matrix illustrates the correlation between underpricing and a selection of fundamental 
variables. Fundamental variables are positively associated with initial returns, except IPO size, which is mildly 
negatively associated with initial returns. However, none of the fundamental variables display significant correlation. 
The dummy variable for post-2004 issues is significant, and positively associated with initial returns. 
70 
 
Comparison with Previous Studies and Discussion 
Compared to previous studies for corporate IPOs in the U.S, MLPs are underpriced relatively less than average 
(Loughran et al., 2012). Results for the MLP IPOs are more similar to levels reported for more similar transactions, 
such as the equity carve-outs examined by Schipper and Smith (1986), where mean initial returns are reported at 4.9 
per cent for 41 equity carve-outs in the time period from 1963 to 1983. Muscarealla and Vetsuypens (1989) also find 
a mean initial return at 2.1 per cent for 76 reverse LBOs during 1986 to 1983. Both sample average initial returns are 
significantly larger than zero, but still below regular levels. In these types of transactions, prior knowledge about the 
value of the firms is better than for regular IPOs, and hence they are more similar to the situation for a majority of 
MLPs coming to market.  
Compared to previous research on MLP IPOs, my results represent a shift in empirical evidence. Both Muscarella 
(1988) and Michaely and Shaw (1994) report no significant underpricing for MLP IPOs that occurred during the 
1980s. Further, Wang et al. (1992) examine a sample of 87 REIT IPOs in the 1980s, and report a -2.82 per cent 
initial return. Similar to MLPs, institutional investors did not participate on a meaningful scale in REIT IPOs at that 
time. The shift in underpricing reported in this paper stems primarily from the group of issues that occurred 
following the passing of the AJCA 04, when institutional investors were granted permission to invest more heavily 
in MLPs. The empirical results are hence consistent with the winner’s curse hypothesis, and suggest that there is an 
association between underpricing and the time when institutional investors became relatively more dominant in the 
pool of IPO participants.  
Fundamental variables such as retention rate and underwriter ranking are positively correlated with underpricing, but 
not significant. As relates to other strands of literature focused on asymmetric information, these tendencies are 
contradictory to some established theoretical arguments. Leland and Pyle (1977) and Tirole (2006) suggest that 
ownership retention by the entrepreneur can function as a signal to investors about the quality of the firm, and hence 
reduce underpricing. In the context of MLPs, the signalling argument might be less meaningful with regards to 
retention rates due to the financing aspect attached to LP unit distributions. Instead of existing owners retaining units 
because they believe the MLP is undervalued, they might choose to retain units due to the prospect of receiving tax 
deferred regular cash payments in the future.  
Underwriter ranking is another variable that has been thought to be negatively associated with underpricing (see for 
example Carter and Manaster, 1990; Michaely and Shaw, 1994). One can argue the case for top tier banks to have 
“more to lose” in terms of damaging their reputation through mispricing IPOs, and that they to a larger extent are 
able to choose between IPO candidates coming to market, and hence selecting chiefly high-quality issuers. Others, 
such as Loughran and Ritter (2004), have found that the association between underpricng and top-tier bank 
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underwriters has changed over time. Moving into the 1990s, they found that top-tier banks underpriced more. 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) explain this shift with the changing issuer objective function, which proposes that issuers 
moved to choose underwriters based on whether they would receive better analyst coverage, and favourable 
allocations of underpriced IPOs. It is then interesting to see that the syndicate size is growing into the 2000s, which 
should imply wider analyst coverage for the issuers.  
Concluding Remarks and Suggestions for Further Research 
Having explored the phenomenon of underpricing in the context of MLPs, it is evident that the MLP asset class is 
relevant also for academic research. Compared to early empirical results conducted using data from the 1980s, the 
empirical evidence on underpricing has shifted, representing an addition to existing literature. It is interesting to see 
that results are also consistent with the winner’s curse hypothesis, illustrated by initial returns becoming positive and 
significant for the period following the introduction of a more meaningful institutional ownership share in the asset 
class. While the results presented document a shift in underpricing, and the shift correlates to the introduction of 
institutional participation in IPOs, the results do not contradict theories focusing of the allocation of IPOs to explain 
underpricing.  For future research it could be interesting to obtain data on the allocation of MLP IPOs, and examine 
whether the shift in underpricing can be associated with more specific strands of existing literature.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Categorisation of MLP Assets 
Upstream Midstream Downstream Other 
 Oil reserves 
 Natural gas reserves 
 Coal reserves 
 Other exhaustible natural 
resource reserves 
 Drilling platforms 
 Drilling rigs 
 Other E&P assets used to 
extract exhaustible natural 
resource reserves 
 Interstate oil and natural gas 
pipelines 
 Intrastate oil and natural gas 
pipelines 
 Petroleum product pipelines 
 Gas gathering and processing 
assets 
 Facilities for gas 
compression, treating and 
fractionation 
 Commodity storage facilities 
 Compressor stations 
 Coal preparation and 
transloading facilities 
 LNG regasification facilities 
 Refinery assets 
 Transportation to wholesaler 
terminals or refineries by: 
- Rail cars 
- Trucks and trailers 
- Barges and tugboats 
- Tankers 
- Propane delivery and 
service vehicles 
 
 Timber 
 Geothermal energy 
 Fertilizer 
 Nitrogen and sulphur 
manufacturing plants 
 Marine transportation 
 Petrochemicals production 
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Appendix 2. Final Sample Data - Master Limited Partnership Initial Public Offerings  
MLP Name Entered Market (IPO) 
IPO price 
(USD) 
First day closing 
price (USD) 
First day 
return Industry 
Alliance Holdings GP LP 10.05.2006 25 25 0.0 % Coal 
Alliance Resource Partners LP 17.08.1999 19 18.81 -1.0 % Coal 
Alon USA Partners LP 20.11.2012 16 17 6.3 % Downstream 
American Midstream Partners LP 27.07.2011 21 20.95 -0.2 % Midstream 
Atlas Energy Resources LLC 13.12.2006 21 22.1 5.2 % Upstream 
Atlas Energy LP 20.07.2006 23 23 0.0 % Upstream 
Atlas Pipeline Partners LP 28.01.2000 13 12.37 -4.8 % Midstream 
Boardwalk Pipeline Partners LP 09.11.2005 19.5 18.95 -2.8 % Midstream 
BreitBurn Energy Partners LP 04.10.2006 18.5 18.21 -1.6 % Upstream 
Buckeye GP Holdings LP 03.08.2006 17 16.23 -4.5 % Midstream 
CVR Partners LP 08.04.2011 16 17.55 9.7 % Other minerals 
Calumet Specialty Products Partners LP 26.01.2006 21.5 21.75 1.2 % Downstream 
Capital Product Partners LP 30.03.2007 21.5 26.75 24.4 % Maritime 
Cheniere Energy Partners LP 20.03.2007 21 21.71 3.4 % Midstream 
Chesapeake Midstream Partners LP 29.07.2010 21 22.4 6.7 % Midstream 
Compressco Partners LP 15.06.2011 20 19 -5.0 % Midstream 
Constellation Energy Partners LLC  11.11.2006 21 21.95 4.5 % Upstream 
Copano Energy LLC 09.11.2004 20 22.7 13.5 % Midstream 
Cornerstone Propane Partners LP 17.12.1996 21 21.37 1.8 % Downstream 
Crosstex Energy LP 12.12.2002 20 20.1 0.5 % Midstream 
DCP Midstream Partners LP 02.12.2005 21.5 23.05 7.2 % Midstream 
Delek Logistics Partners LP 02.11.2012 21 22.35 6.4 % Midstream 
Duncan Energy Partners LP 31.01.2007 21 23.05 9.8 % Midstream 
EV Energy  Partners LP 27.09.2006 20 19.79 -1.1 % Upstream 
Eagle Rock Energy Partners LP 25.10.2006 19 18 -5.3 % Midstream 
El Paso Pipeline Partners LP 16.11.2007 20 20.9 4.5 % Midstream 
Encore Energy Partners LP 12.09.2007 21 21.03 0.1 % Upstream 
Energy Transfer Equity LP 03.02.2006 21 22.65 7.9 % Midstream 
Enterprise GP Holdings LP 24.08.2005 28 32.55 16.3 % Midstream 
Enterprise Products Partners LP 28.07.1998 22 21.5 -2.3 % Midstream 
EQT Midstream Partners LP 27.06.2012 21 23.75 13.1 % Midstream 
Ferrellgas Partners LP 28.06.1994 21 21 0.0 % Downstream 
Genesis Energy LP 27.11.1996 20.62 20.75 0.6 % Midstream 
Global Partners LP 29.09.2005 22 23.7 7.7 % Downstream 
Golar LNG Partners LP 08.04.2011 22.5 24.85 10.4 % Maritime 
Heritage Propane Partners LP 25.06.1996 20.25 20.25 0.0 % Midstream 
Hi-Crush Partners LP 16.08.2012 17 20 17.6 % Other minerals 
Hiland Holdings GP LP 20.09.2006 18.5 19.25 4.1 % Midstream 
Hiland Partners LP 10.02.2005 22.5 29.05 29.1 % Midstream 
Holly Energy Partners LP 08.07.2004 22.25 24.55 10.3 % Midstream 
Inergy Holdings LP 21.06.2005 22.5 27.83 23.7 % Downstream 
Inergy LP 26.07.2001 22 23.5 6.8 % Downstream 
Inergy Midstream LP 16.12.2011 17 17.65 3.8 % Midstream 
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K-Sea Transportation Partners LP 09.01.2004 23.5 27.09 15.3 % Maritime 
LRR Energy LP 11.11.2011 19 19.05 0.3 % Upstream 
Legacy Reserves LP 11.01.2007 19 20.3 6.8 % Upstream 
Lehigh Gas Partners LP 25.10.2012 20 20.23 1.2 % Downstream 
Linn Energy LLC 13.01.2006 21 22 4.8 % Upstream 
Magellan Midstream Holdings LP 10.02.2006 24.5 24 -2.0 % Midstream 
MarkWest Energy Partners LP 21.05.2002 20.5 20.55 0.2 % Midstream 
Martin Midstream Partners LP 01.11.2002 19 17.7 -6.8 % Maritime 
Memorial Production Partners LP 09.12.2011 19 18.79 -1.1 % Upstream 
Mid-Con Energy Partners LP 15.12.2011 18 18.05 0.3 % Upstream 
MPLX LP 26.10.2012 22 27.2 23.6 % Midstream 
NGL Energy Partners LP 12.05.2011 21 20.98 -0.1 % Downstream 
National Propane Partners LP 27.06.1996 21 21 0.0 % Downstream 
Natural Resource Partners LP 11.10.2002 20 19.4 -3.0 % Coal 
Navios Maritime Partners LP 13.11.2007 20 19.25 -3.8 % Maritime 
Niska Gas Storage Partners LLC 12.05.2010 20 19.1 -4.5 % Midstream 
Northern Tier Energy LP 26.07.2012 14 14.16 1.1 % Downstream 
OSG America LP 08.11.2007 19 18.85 -0.8 % Maritime 
Oiltanking Partners LP 14.07.2011 21.5 23.7 10.2 % Midstream 
Oxford Resource Partners LP 13.07.2010 18.5 17.96 -2.9 % Coal 
PAA Natural Gas Storage LP 30.04.2010 21.5 23.25 8.1 % Midstream 
Pacific Energy Partners LP 23.07.2002 19.5 19 -2.6 % Midstream 
Penn Virginia GP Holdings LP 05.12.2006 18.5 18 -2.7 % Coal 
Penn Virginia Resource Partners LP 25.10.2001 21 22.7 8.1 % Coal 
PetroLogistics LP 04.05.2012 17 16.5 -2.9 % Downstream 
Pioneer Southwest Energy Partners LP 30.04.2008 19 19.65 3.4 % Upstream 
Plains All American Pipeline LP 18.11.1998 20 20 0.0 % Midstream 
QR Energy LP 16.12.2010 19.18 19.6 2.2 % Upstream 
Quest Energy Partners LP 08.11.2007 18 16.5 -8.3 % Upstream 
Quicksilver Gas Services LP 06.08.2007 21 21 0.0 % Midstream 
Regency Energy Partners LP 31.01.2006 20 19.81 -1.0 % Midstream 
Rentech Nitrogen Partners LP 04.11.2011 20 19.85 -0.7 % Other minerals 
Rhino Resource Partners LP 29.09.2010 20 21.9 9.5 % Coal 
Rose Rock Midstream LP 09.12.2011 20 20 0.0 % Midstream 
Seadrill Partners LLC 19.10.2012 22 23.67 7.6 % Upstream 
SemGroup Energy Partners LP 18.07.2007 22 29.32 33.3 % Midstream 
Shamrock Logistics LP 16.04.2001 24.5 28 14.3 % Midstream 
Southcross Energy Partners LP 02.11.2012 20 22.35 11.8 % Midstream 
Spectra Energy Partners LP 27.06.2007 22 28.65 30.2 % Midstream 
StoneMor Partners LP 15.09.2004 20.5 21.6 5.4 % Midstream 
Summit Midstream Partners LP 28.09.2012 20 21.11 5.6 % Midstream 
Sunoco Logistics Partners LP 05.02.2002 20.5 24 17.1 % Midstream 
Susser Petroleum Partners LP 20.09.2012 20.5 22.91 11.8 % Downstream 
TC PipeLines LP 25.05.1999 20.5 20.56 0.3 % Midstream 
Targa Resources Partners LP 09.02.2007 21 23.76 13.1 % Midstream 
Teekay LNG Partners LP 05.05.2005 22 24.3 10.5 % Maritime 
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Teekay Offshore Partners LP 14.12.2006 21 25 19.0 % Maritime 
Tesoro Logistics LP 20.04.2011 21 23.5 11.9 % Downstream 
Transmontaigne Partners LP 25.05.2005 21.4 24.51 14.5 % Downstream 
U.S. Shipping Partners LP 29.10.2004 22.25 23.25 4.5 % Maritime 
Universal Compression Partners LP 17.10.2006 21 22.53 7.3 % Midstream 
Valero GP Holdings LLC 14.07.2006 22 22 0.0 % Midstream 
Vanguard Natural Resources LLC 24.10.2007 19 18.94 -0.3 % Upstream 
Western Gas Partners LP 08.05.2008 16.5 16.5 0.0 % Midstream 
Williams Energy Partners LP 06.02.2001 21.5 24 11.6 % Midstream 
Williams Partners LP 18.08.2005 21.5 25.5 18.6 % Midstream 
Williams Pipeline Partners LP 17.01.2008 20 20 0.0 % Midstream 
 
